Showing posts with label Caesar. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Caesar. Show all posts

Saturday 2 January 2021

CAESAR: "DE BELLO CIVILI": BOOK II

Introduction:

Book II of the " De Bello Civili" is the last of the books actually written by Caesar (i.e. "De Bello Gallico" I - VII and "De Bello Civili I - III)  to be translated by Sabidius. It is also perhaps the least read of all these books. Why should this be? Perhaps, because it is the one in which Caesar's fortunes are least successful. Much of the first half of the Book is taken up by the frustratingly protracted siege of Massilia, and, although the eventual fall of this port is followed by Caesar's success in winning the submission of Further Spain without the need for any fighting, the second part of the Book, i.e. Chapters 23-44, covers in some considerable detail the doomed campaign of Gaius Scribonius Curio in North Africa, where, after some initial successes, Curio is defeated and killed near Utica by a Pompeian army led by Attius Varus, heavily reinforced by the Numidian king Juba, one of Caesar's arch-enemies. Since the rationale for Caesar's 'Commentaries' is generally considered to involve propaganda, one does wonder why Caesar should have invested so much time and effort in writing of this sole example of a Caesarian campaign that ends in total disaster. The likely answer would seem to lie in Caesar's very high regard for Curio, who, if he had survived this African debacle, would probably have remained his senior and most trusted subordinate. He emphasises Curio's heroic death, when he refuses to seek his own salvation in flight and asserts that he could never look Caesar in the face again, having lost the army to which he had been entrusted: "ita proelians interficitur" - 'and so he died fighting' (see Chapter 42). Perhaps Caesar also felt some subsequent guilt about Curio's tragic death, in that he had given such great responsibilities to a man, who, although he was a great orator and politician, was of limited military experience, and that the army he commanded was much less experienced and reliable than the one he was leading himself. Perhaps in the end though, there is some propaganda value even in reading of Curio's defeat, in that it emphasises that Caesar's armies never lost a campaign when he himself was leading them, and indeed it surely makes his great victory over the Pompeians and Juba at Thapsus in 46 seem all the more remarkable.     

1. The Siege of Massilia (Chapters 1-16).

Chapter 1.  While these (things) were happening in Spain, his legate Gaius Trebonius, who had been left behind to (conduct) the siege of Massilia (i.e. Marseilles), began to bring up against the town a mound, penthouses and siege towers in two places. One (of these) was near to the harbour and dockyards, (and) the other by the gate, through which there was access (to the road) from Gaul and Spain, (and) to that (stretch of) sea which lay close to the mouth of the Rhone. For Massilia is washed by the sea on almost three sides of the town; it is the remaining fourth (side) which provides access to the land. As part of this space (is) that which belongs to the citadel, the nature of the place, fortified (as it is) by a very deep valley, ensures that any siege (will be) a long and difficult (one). In order to accomplish these works, Gaius Trebonius summoned a great multitude of men and beasts of burden from the whole of the province, and ordered wicker hurdles and timber to be collected. These things having been provided, he raised a mound eighty feet in height. 

Chapter 2.  But so great a stock of all the things required for war had been (laid up) in the town sometime ago, and such a great quantity of war engines, that no penthouses (i.e. screens) woven of wickerwork could withstand their force. For poles, twelve feet (high, were) tipped with metal-points, and these, fired from enormous catapults, crashed into the ground through four layers of wickerwork. So, the arcades (i.e. protective galleries) were covered over with timbers, a foot (thick), joined to one another, and, due to this, (the material for) the mound was carried from hand to hand. A 'tortoise' (i.e. a long, tunnel-like shed) went in front in order to level the ground, (and it was) also made of very strong timber intertwined with everything by which they could be defended from firebrands and stones thrown (by the enemy). But the size of the task, the height of the wall and the towers, (and) the large number of war engines, retarded all their efforts. Besides, frequent sallies were made from the town by the Albici (i.e. a tribe living in the hills to the north-east of Massilia), and fire was thrown at our mound and siege towers. Our men easily repelled these (attacks), and, in addition to inflicting heavy losses on those who had made the sally, they drove (them) back into the town.   

Chapter 3.  In the meantime, Lucius Nasidius had been sent by Gnaeus Pompeius (Magnus) with a fleet of sixteen ships, a few of which had bronze (beaks), to the assistance of Lucius Domitius (Ahenobarbus) and the Massiliotes, and had sailed through the Sicilian straits without the knowledge, and against the expectation, of (Gaius Scribonius) Curio, and, after his ships had been put in to land at Messana, and a flight of the leaders and local council had occurred on account of their sudden panic, he carried off a ship from their dockyards. When this had been attached to the rest of his ships, he resumed his journey towards Massilia, and, having sent a small boat secretly ahead, he informed Domitius and the Massiliotes of his approach, and urged them strongly to engage (Decimus Junius) Brutus' fleet once more, as soon as his reinforcements had been added. 

Chapter 4.  After their earlier setback, the Massiliotes had brought the same number of old ships out of their dockyards (as they had previously lost), and had repaired and refitted (them) with great industry - and a great supply of oarsmen and pilots was available (to them) - and they had added some fishing boats and had covered (them) over (with decking), so that their oarsmen might be safe from the flight of missiles; (and) these they filled up with archers and catapults. When their fleet had been equipped in such a manner, they climbed aboard the ships, encouraged by the prayers and tears of all the old men, family matrons (and) maidens (to) come to the aid of their state at this dire moment, (and) with no less courage and confidence than (they had shown when) they had fought before. For it is a common defect of our nature that in unfamiliar and unknown circumstances we tend to be over-confident or excessively afraid; (and) so it happened on this occasion. For the arrival of Lucius Nasidius filled the community with great optimism and enthusiasm. When they got a suitable wind, they left harbour and went to (join) Nasidius at Taurois, which is a fortress belonging to the Massiliotes, and there they prepared their ships for action, and strengthened their resolve to fight once more. The right wing was assigned to the Massiliotes, and the left to Nasidius.   

Chapter 5.  Brutus hurried to the same (place) with an increased number of ships. For to those which had been built by Caesar at Arelate (i.e. the modern Arles), six (ships) captured from the Massiliotes were added. These he had repaired and fitted out with all necessities. Accordingly, having encouraged his (men) to despise a vanquished (people) whom they had conquered (when they were) at full strength, he advanced against them full of optimism and ardour. From Gaius Trebonius' camp and all the higher grounds it was easy to see into the city, (and see) how all the young men who had remained in the town, and all those of more advanced age, together with their wives and children, were stretching their hands up to heaven from the public squares and watch-towers or from the wall, or were going into the temples of the immortal gods, and, prostrating themselves before their statues, were imploring the gods for victory. Nor was there a single one out of all (of them) but that he thought that the fate of all his fortunes depended on the outcome of that day. For the pick of the young men and the most eminent of every age (group), having been summoned and entreated, climbed aboard ship, so that, if anything adverse happened, they might see that nothing would be left to them to attempt; (and,) if they were to conquer, they might ensure the safety of the city, either by their domestic resources or by external assistance.  

Chapter 6.  When battle was joined, nothing was lacking to the Massiliotes with regard to their courage. But, mindful of their instructions, which they had received from their (friends) shortly before, they fought with such spirit, as they thought they would not have another opportunity to try (the fortunes of battle), and they believed that those to whom danger to life would occur in battle would not precede for so very long the fate of the remaining citizens, who, if their city were taken, would have to suffer the same fortune of war. Our ships having gradually dispersed, room was given both to the skill of their helmsmen and the manoevrability of their ships, and, if ever our (men), having gained an opportunity by casting iron hooks, had tied up a ship, they came from all directions to the assistance of their (ships) that were in trouble. Nor, indeed, after the Albici had joined (them), were they lacking in hand-to-hand fighting, nor were they much inferior to our (men) in valour. At the same time, a great shower of darts, thrown from a distance from their smaller ships unexpectedly inflicted several wounds on our (men), off-guard and hampered (by other duties, as they were). And two of their three-decked ships having sighted the ship of Decimus Brutus, which could be easily recognised by its flag, rushed up against it from both sides. But Brutus, having foreseen their design, extricated his ship with such speed that it got clear (of them) just in time. Sailing as rapidly (as they were), thy struck each other so heavily that they were both severely damaged by the collision, (and) indeed the beak of one (of them) was broken off and the whole (ship) was on the verge of foundering. This event having been observed, the ships of Brutus' fleet that were nearest to that spot made an attack on them, and sank (them) both. 

Chapter 7.  But Nasidius' ships were not of any use, and quickly withdrew from the battle. For neither the sight of their homeland, nor the injunctions of their kinsmen, were compelling them to enter (a situation) of extreme risk to their lives. And so, of the number of their ships not one was lost; of the fleet of the Massiliotes five (ships) were sunk, four taken, (and) one escaped with those of Nasidius; all of these made their way to Further Spain. But, when one of the remaining ships, which had been sent on ahead to convey the news of this (event), came near to the city, a whole multitude (of people) rushed out  to discover (what had happened), and, when they learned of the outcome, such grief took hold (of them), that the city seemed to have been captured by the enemy at the same moment. Yet, despite this, the Massiliotes began to make other arrangements for the defence of their city.   

Chapter 8.  It was observed by the legionaries who were engaged on the right-hand part of the (siege-)works that they could have considerable protection from the frequent sallies of the enemy, if they should build a tower there close to the wall as a stronghold and place of refuge. To begin with, they built a small low (structure) to (guard) against sudden incursions. Into this thy retired; from it they defended themselves, if any rather large force attacked (them); (and) from it they sallied forth to repel and pursue the enemy. It extended thirty feet in every direction, while the thickness of its walls (was) five feet. But later, as experience is the master of all things, man's ingenuity was applied, and it was found that it could be of great use, if it were raised to the height of a tower. This was achieved in the following way. 

Chapter 9.  When the height of the tower reached the (level of) a storey, they laid the flooring against the walls in  such a manner that the ends of the joists were covered by the outer structure of the walls, so that nothing should stick out to which the enemy's firebrands might cling. In addition, they built up this timber-work with small bricks as high as the roofs of the penthouses and screens allowed, and on top of that place they laid two joists across, not far from the outer walls, by which they supported that wooden framework which was going (to be) a covering for the tower, and on top of these joists they laid beams across at right angles, and held these down with planks. They made these beams rather longer and more prominent than the ends of the walls were, so that they could stick out in front of (the place) where the roof was, in order to ward off and repel blows, while they were constructing the walls inside this wooden frame; and they covered the top of that wooden framework with bricks and clay, so that none of the enemy's fire could damage (it), and they laid pads of rags on top of (it), lest any missiles hurled by ballistas might break through the flooring, or rocks (fired) from catapults might smash the brickwork. 

Moreover, they made three mats, four feet broad, out of anchor cables (to fit) along the length of the walls of the tower, and they fastened these so that they were hanging down around the tower from the projecting (ends of) the beams on the three sides that were facing the enemy; they had learned from experience in other places that this (was) the one type of covering that could not be penetrated by any dart or ballistic engine. But, when that part of the tower which had been completed was shielded and protected from all of the enemy's missiles, they removed the penthouses to other (parts of) the (siege-)works; they began to suspend and raise the roof of the tower from the first storey entirely by leverage. When they had raised (it) as far as the lowering of the mats permitted, hidden and secured within these coverings (as they were), they built up the walls with bricks, and freed space for themselves to build by further leverage again. When it seemed (to be) the time for a second storey, they laid joists such as (they had) at first, protected by external brickwork, and from the flooring they raised up the roof and the matting once more. So, securely, and without any injury or danger, they raised (it) six storeys high, and, in (the course of) building, left apertures in those places where it seemed appropriate for a ballista to discharge (missiles).   

Chapter 10.  When they were confident that from this tower they could protect the (siege-)works that were (taking place) nearby, they began to build a covered gallery, sixty feet long, (made) of timber two feet square, which they could extend from their brick tower to the enemy's tower and wall. The structure of this gallery was as follows. First, two beams of equal length were placed on the ground at a distance of four feet between them, and small (wooden) pillars five feet high were firmly fixed on these. They connected these one to another by cross-beams (forming) a slight gable, on which joists, which they had set aside for the sake of covering the gallery, were placed. Above this they put joists two feet square, and these they fastened with iron plates and nails. At the top of the roof of the gallery and (on) the uppermost beams, they fixed posts extending four inches square which held the bricks which were piled up on top of the shed. So, when (the roof) had been gabled and properly constructed, so that the timbers had been laid on the cross-beams, the gallery was covered with bricks and clay, so it should be secure from the firebrands which might be thrown from the wall. Over the bricks hides were spread, so that water let loose from pipes could not dissolve the bricks. Moreover, the hides were again covered over with pads of rags, so they should not be destroyed by fire and stones. Under the protection of penthouses, they completed this work to that tower of ours, and suddenly, and with the enemy off guard, they moved (it) right up to the enemy's tower, so that it was (even) connected to their building. 

Chapter 11.  Alarmed at this sudden calamity, the townsmen pushed forward with levers rocks (which were) as large as they could (manage), and, casting (them) from the wall, they rolled (them) down on to the gallery. The strength of the timber withstood the impact, and whatever fell (on it) slid off due to the gallery's sloping roof. When they saw this, they changed their plan; they set fire to barrels filled with firewood and pitch, and rolled these down from the wall on to the gallery. They rolled and fell off, and, as they fell down at the sides, they were removed from the works by long poles and forks. Meanwhile, inside the gallery our soldiers, (using) crowbars, were breaking up the lowest (row of) rocks in the enemy's tower, on which its foundations depended. The gallery was defended by missiles (thrown) from ballistas by our (men) from the brick tower; the enemy were driven away from the wall and its turrets; nor was  any free opportunity given (to them) of defending their wall. Now, when several stones from that part of the wall which was beneath the tower were withdrawn, part of the tower suddenly fell toppling down, (and) the remaining part began to slope forward in consequence; when the enemy, alarmed at (the thought of) their city being sacked, rushed out of the gate in unison, unarmed and with fillets (on their heads), they stretched forth their hands in supplication to our officers and army.   

Chapter 12.  When this new development occurred, the whole operation of the war came to  a standstill, and the soldiers turning away from battle, eagerly rushed out to hear and find out (what was going on). When the enemy came up to our officers and army, they all of them fell prostrate at their feet, and begged (them) to await Caesar's arrival. (They said) that their city (was) taken, our works completed, (and) their tower undermined; and so they were giving up its defence. (They said) that no obstacle could arise that (would prevent them) from being instantly sacked when he arrived, unless they were to carry out his orders at his behest. They pointed out that, if the tower were to collapse completely, our soldiers could not be stopped from bursting into the city in the hope of booty and sacking the city. These and several other (arguments) of the same kind were delivered with much piteousness and lamentation.    

Chapter 13.

The officers, moved by these (appeals), withdrew their men from the (siege(-works) and ceased the assault; they left sentries at the works. Some sort of truce was effected, and Caesar's arrival was awaited. No missile was launched from the wall and none by our (men); as if the issue had been completed, they all relaxed their care and attentiveness. For Caesar had strictly instructed Trebonius in dispatches not to allow the town to be stormed by force, lest the soldiers, deeply aroused both by their resentment of the revolt and the contempt (that had been shown) to them, and their protracted labour, might kill all the adult men. They were threatening that they would do (just) this, and, at that time, they were (only) restrained from breaking into the town with difficulty, and they bitterly resented this situation, because it seemed (to them) that they had been prevented by Trebonius from taking over the town. 

Chapter 14.

But the enemy, (being) without honour, were seeking a time and an opportunity for fraud and treachery, and, after some days had passed, and our (men) had become listless and absent-minded, all of a sudden at midday, when some of our men were absent (and) others had devoted themselves to rest from their long labours on the very (siege-)works themselves, while all their arms had been put away and covered up, they burst out of the gates, and, (assisted) by a strong following wind, set fire to the (siege-)works. The wind spread it in such a manner that, at a single moment, the siege-wall, the penthouses, the tortoise, the tower (and) the missile-engines caught fire, and all these (things) were consumed before it could be determined how it had happened. Our (men), alarmed by this unexpected misfortune, seized hold of what arms they could (find), and some (of them) rushed out of the camp. An attack was made by them on the enemy, but they were prevented from pursuing (them) as they fled by arrows and missiles (fired) from the wall. The (enemy) retired close to their wall, and there they freely set alight to the gallery, and the brick tower. So, the work of many months was destroyed in a moment of time by the enemy's perfidy and the strength of the storm-wind. The Massiliotes tried the same (thing) the next day. Having obtained another such storm-wind, they fought with greater confidence, and brought a large quantity of firebrands (with them) in a sally against the other tower and siege-wall. But, just as our (men) had given up all (thoughts of) a contest on the previous occasion, so (now), warned by the events of the day before, they had made every preparation for a defence. And so, after many had been killed, they drove the rest back into the town without having achieved their purpose.    

Chapter 15.

Trebonius began to rearrange and repair what had been lost with much greater enthusiasm on the part of his men. For, when they realised that their hard work and preparations had utterly gone up in smoke, they were stung by the thought that their valour had been held up to ridicule through the crime of a truce being violated, and, because there was nowhere from which (the materials needed to build) a siege-wall could, in any way, be collected, as all the timbers for miles around within the territories of the Massiliotes had been cut down and carried off, they began to construct a siege-wall of a new and unheard of kind, (made) from two walls of brick, six feet in thickness, and with a floor between these walls of a height almost equal to the old siege-wall which had been piled up out of timber. Wherever the space between the walls or the weakness of the timber appeared to require (it), pillars were inserted and cross-beams were laid in order to provide support, and the (space) which was floored was covered over with wickerwork hurdles (and) the hurdles were plastered with mortar. The soldiers, with a roof overhead, protected by a wall on their right and left, and with a screen put down in front (of them), brought up without any danger whatever they needed for the (building) work. The business proceeded quickly; the loss of their protracted labour was soon restored by the adroitness and fortitude of the soldiers. Gateways were left in the wall at places which seemed suitable for the purpose of (making) sallies.  

Chapter 16. 

When the enemy had seen that those (works), which they had hoped could not be restored for a long and tedious period of time, had been so far repaired by the work and labour of a few days, that there was no scope for treachery or sallies, and that absolutely no means were left (to them) by which it would be possible to injure our men with missiles or the siege(-works) with fire, and they realised that all of the city to which there was access by land could be surrounded in the same way by a wall and towers, so that there would not be room (for them) to stand on their own fortifications, since a wall seemed to have been built on top of their walls and missiles could be hurled by hand, and that the use of their catapults, on which they had placed great hopes, was at an end, due to the narrow space (between the lines), and they were aware that, if given the chance of fighting from the wall and towers on equal (terms), they could not match our (men) in valour, they had recourse to the same terms of surrender.   

2. Spain - the surrender of Varro (Chapters 17-22).

Chapter 17.

In Further Spain, Marcus (Terentius) Varro, when he heard at the start (of the disturbances) of the events which were taking place in Italy, (and) being doubtful of Pompeius' chances of success, spoke of Caesar in very amicable terms: (he said) that he had previously been appointed as legate by Gnaeus Pompeius, and that he was bound in honour to hold (this post); indeed, (while) his ties of friendship with Caesar were no less strong, he was not unaware of what were the duties of a legate who held an office in trust, what his own strengths were, and the extent of the good will of the whole province towards Caesar. He said such (things) in all his conversations, and did not attach himself to any party. But, afterwards, when he learned that Caesar had been held up at Massilia, that the forces of (Marcus) Petreius had been joined with the army of (Lucius) Afranius, that a considerable (number of) auxiliaries had combined with (them) and that there were great hopes and expectations (of more), and that the whole Hither Province was united in its allegiance, and he received (reports of) what had afterwards occurred concerning (Caesar's) difficulties over the corn supply at Ilerda, and Afranius described these (things) to him more fully and in an exaggerated form, he too began to move in step with fortune.    

Chapter 18.

He (i.e. Varro) held levies throughout the province, and he brought his two legions up to full strength and added about thirty auxiliary cohorts. He collected a large quantity of corn, to send to the Massiliotes, and also to Afranius and Petreius. He ordered the inhabitants of Gades (i.e. the modern Cadiz) to build ten warships, and arranged for several (more) to be built at Hispalis (i.e. the modern Seville) in addition. He transferred all the money and all the ornaments from the temple of Hercules into the town of Gades; he sent six cohorts there from the province as a garrison, and he placed the town of Gades under the command of Gaius Gallonius, a Roman knight and a friend of Domitius, who had come there because he had been sent by Domitius to take care of an inherited estate; all the weapons, (both) private and public, he deposited into Gallonius' house. He, himself, held public meetings (where he was) heavily critical of Caesar. He frequently announced from his official platform that Caesar had fought (several) unsuccessful battles, (and) that a great number of his soldiers had gone over from him to Afranius; (he said) that he had learned of these (things) from reliable messengers, (and) on good authority. By means of these reports, he (so) alarmed the Roman citizens of his province that he compelled (them) to promise him for the conduct of his government two hundred and thirty thousand sesterces, and twenty thousand pounds of silver, and a hundred and twenty thousand pecks of wheat. Those city-states which he thought friendly to Caesar, on them he imposed heavier burdens and placed garrisons there (i.e. they then had to bear the cost of billeting these troops), and brought prosecutions against private (individuals) who were alleged to have spoken words and made speeches against the republic; their property he publicly auctioned. He forced the whole province to swear an oath of allegiance to himself and Pompeius. On learning of the events which were taking place in Hither Spain, he prepared for war. Now his plan of war was this, to go to Gades with his two legions, (and) to keep all his ships and corn there; for he had learned that the whole province was in favour of Caesar's party. He thought that the war could be prolonged without difficulty on an island, if he were provided with corn and shipping.

Caesar, although he was being called back to Italy for many important reasons, yet he had decided to leave no part of the war in Spain behind (him), as he knew of the great (number of) benefits (conferred) by Pompeius on the Hither Province and the great (number of) clients (that he had there)     

Chapter 19.

So, having sent two legions into Further Spain with Quintus Cassius, the tribune of the people (n.b. it was most unusual for a tribune to be employed in a military capacity during his year of office), he himself proceeded (there) with six hundred cavalry by forced marches, and sent ahead (of him) a proclamation (specifying) the day on which he wished the magistrates and chief men of all the city-states to meet him at Corduba (i.e. a town on the river Baetis, now the Guadalquivir, which was the capital of Further Spain; the modern Cordova). This edict having been published throughout the province, there was no state that did not send a part of its senate to Corduba at the appointed time, (and there was) no Roman citizen of any repute but that he came there on that day. At the same time, the assembly of Corduba closed its gates to Varro of its own accord, and stationed guards and watchmen in their towers and (on) their wall, (and) kept with them two cohorts, which were called the colonials (i.e. they had been levied in Roman colonies), since they had come there by chance, to guard the town. During the same period, after three cohorts had been installed in the town's citadel as a garrison by Varro, the inhabitants of Carmo (i.e. the modern Carmona, a town in Further Spain, about thirteen miles from Hispalis), by far the strongest city-state in the whole province, ejected these cohorts on their own initiative, and shut their gates.  

Chapter 20.

Indeed, for this reason, Varro was all the more anxious to to make haste to march to Gades with his legions as soon as possible, lest he should be cut off on his march or sea-crossing; so great and so supportive towards Caesar was the goodwill of the province discovered to be. When he had proceeded a little further, a dispatch from Gades was delivered to him, (saying that) as soon as they had learned of Caesar's edict, the leading citizens of Gades had agreed with the tribunes of the cohorts, which were in the garrison there, to expel Gallonius from the town, and to retain the city and the island (i.e. at that time Gades was still separated from the mainland by a small channel) for Caesar. This course of action having been agreed, they warned Gallonius to leave of his own accord while he could (still do so) safely. When Varro, alarmed by these events, altered his route and sent (word) ahead that he would be coming to Italica (i.e. a town on the northern bank of the River Baetis, just to the north of Hispalis) he was informed by its inhabitants that their gates had been closed against (him). So then, having been barred from every route, he sent (word) to Caesar that he was ready to deliver up the legion to whoever he should designate. He (i.e. Caesar) sent Sextus (Julius) Caesar (i.e. Julius Caesar's first cousin once removed) to him and ordered that it should be handed over to him. Having handed over his legion, Varro came to (see) Caesar at Corduba. Having given him a faithful account of his public (monies), he gave up the money that was in his possession and indicated the whereabouts of the corn and shipping that he had. 

Chapter 21.

Holding a public meeting at Corduba, Caesar gave thanks to everyone, group by group: the Roman citizens because they had diligently taken the town under their own control, the Spaniards because they had driven out the garrison, and the people of Gades because they had thwarted the efforts of his adversaries and had asserted their right to liberty, (and) the military tribunes and centurions, who had come there to provide a garrison, because they had courageously supported those peoples' decisions. He remitted to the Roman citizens the money which they had publicly promised to Varro; he restored their property to those whom he learned had suffered the punishment (of confiscation) for speaking out too freely. He bestowed certain rewards on (both) communities and individuals, and filled the minds of the rest with good hopes for the future, and, after spending two days at Corduba, he set out for Gades; he ordered that the money and the treasures which had been taken from the temple of Hercules to a private dwelling should be restored to the temple. He put Quintus Cassius in charge of the province (i.e. Further Spain); he assigned four legions to him. He himself arrived with the ships, which Marcus Varro (had built) and which the Gaditani had built on Varro's orders, at Tarraco (i.e. the modern Tarragona, a port on the north-east coast of Spain) in a few days. There deputations from almost the whole of the Hither Province were awaiting Caesar's arrival. Having bestowed honours on certain city states in the same way, both to individuals and to groups, he left Tarraco and came by land to Narbo (i.e. the modern Narbonne), and from there to Massilia. There he learned that a law (had been) passed concerning (the appointment of) a dictator, and that he had been appointed dictator by the praetor Marcus (Aemilius) Lepidus (i.e. the future triumvir).     

 3.  Massilia capitulates (Chapter 22).

Chapter 22.

The Massiliotes  had been worn out by all kinds of misfortunes: they had suffered an extreme shortage in their supply of corn, they had twice been defeated in a naval battle, they had been routed in their frequent sallies, they had been struck down by a severe pestilence, the result of the long siege and the change in their diet - for they were subsisting on stale millet and rotten barley, (stocks of) which they had stored in a public warehouse for just such an emergency - , a tower had collapsed, a large section of their wall had been undermined, (and) they had despaired of any assistance from the provinces and their armies, which they had learned had come under Caesar's control; (so) they had decided to surrender in earnest. However, a few days before, Lucius Domitius, having learned of the Massiliotes' intentions, had got together three ships, two of which  he had assigned to his associates, (and) one he had embarked upon himself, (and) he set sail as soon as he got stormy weather. Ships, which were keeping watch near the harbour in accordance with daily routine on the orders of Brutus, observed him, and, raising their anchors, began to pursue (him). His own single ship sailed away from them and persisted in flight, and with the help of the storm disappeared from sight, (but the other) two, alarmed at meeting our ships, returned to harbour. The Massiliotes brought their weapons and catapults out of the town, as they had been ordered, took their ships and out of the harbour and the dockyards, (and) handed over the money from their treasury. After these (things) had been done, Caesar, sparing them more on account of the name and the age of the city rather than on account of its services to himself, left two legions there as a garrison, (and) sent the rest to Italy; he himself set out for the City.   

4.  Africa - Curio's campaign (Chapters 23-36).

Chapter 23. 

At the same time, Gaius (Scribonius) Curio (i.e. tribune of the people 50), after sailing to Africa from Sicily, and already scorning from the outset the forces of Publius Attius Varus (i.e. praetor in 53), transported two of the four legions which he had received from Caesar and five hundred cavalry, and, having spent two days and three nights on the voyage, he came in to land at the place which is called Anquillaria. This place is twenty-two miles from Clupea (i.e. a port on the north coast of Africa) and has fairly good anchorage in summer and is enclosed between two projecting promontories. Lucius (Julius) Caesar, the son (i.e. Julius Caesar's third cousin once removed, and the son of Lucius Julius Caesar, consul in 64; he was also first cousin of Marcus Antonius, tribune of the people 49), had been awaiting his arrival off Clupea with ten warships, which ships, having been beached at Utica (i.e. the principal town of Roman North Africa) after the war with the pirates (i.e. Pompeius' campaign in 67), Publius Attius had repaired and fitted out for use in this war, but, alarmed at the large number of our ships, he fled from the sea, and, having run aground his own decked trireme on the nearest shore and having left (it there) on the beach, he fled for refuge to Hadrumetum (i.e. a town on the east coast of Tunisia) by land. Gaius Considius Longus (i.e. praetor perhaps in 52) guarded this town with a garrison of one legion (i.e. on behalf of Pompeius). After his flight, the rest of Caesar's (i.e. Lucius Caesar's) ships retired to Hadrumetum. The quaestor Marcius Rufus pursued him (i.e. Lucius Caesar) with twelve ships, which Curio had brought (with him) from Sicily as an escort for the transport ships, and, when he saw the ship (that had been) abandoned on the shore, he hauled it off with a towrope; he himself returned to Gaius Curio with his fleet. 

 Chapter 24.  

Curio sent Marcius ahead to Utica with his ships. He himself set out with his army at the same time and, after advancing on the march for two days, he came to the river Bagradas (i.e. the principal river of Roman North Africa). There he left his lieutenant Gaius Caninius Rebilus with the legions; he himself went forward with the cavalry to reconnoitre Castra Cornelia (i.e. the site of the camp of Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus in his campaign against Hannibal in 202), because that place was thought highly suitable for a camp. Now it is a straight ridge jutting out into the sea, very steep and rugged on both sides, but yet with a slightly more gentle slope on the side which faces Utica. By the direct route it is little more than a mile from Utica. But on this route there is a spring, over which the sea flows for some distance, and this ground is extensively flooded; if anyone would wish to avoid it, he (must) reach the town by a six mile detour.  

Chapter 25. 

While exploring this place, Curio caught sight of Varius' camp adjoining the town wall at a gate which is called Belica (i.e. the War-gate), well fortified by the nature of its location, on one side by the town of Utica itself, (and) on the other by a theatre, which lies in front of the town, access to the camp (being rendered) difficult and narrow by the very substantial foundations of that structure. At the same time, he observed the many (things) being transported and driven from every quarter along the very full roads, which were being conveyed from the countryside to the town in alarm at the sudden disturbance. He sent his cavalry after them, to despoil (them) and treat (them) like booty; and at the same time six hundred Numidian cavalry and four hundred infantry, which king Juba had sent to Utica a few days before for the sake of reinforcements, were sent by Varus as an escort for these things. There was a paternal (bond of) friendship between him (i.e. Juba) and Pompeius, and a feud (between him) and Curio, because (the latter as) tribune of the people had proposed a law, by which measure Juba's kingdom would have become the property of the (Roman) people. The cavalry joined battle with each other; but the Numidians could not withstand our charge, but, after about a hundred and twenty (of them) had been killed, the rest withdrew to their camp near the town. Meanwhile, on the arrival of his warships, Curio ordered that a proclamation should be issued to the merchant ships which were lying off Utica, around two hundred in number, that he would consider as enemies (any) who did not take their vessels across to Castra Cornelia at once. As soon as this proclamation had been made, they instantly raised their anchors and left Utica and crossed over to (the place) where they had been commanded (to go). This circumstance furnished the army with supplies of everything.      

Chapter 26.

These things having been done, Curio returned to his camp by the Bagradas and was hailed 'imperator' by the acclamation of the whole army, and on the following day he led his army to Utica and pitched camp near the town. While the work on the camp had not yet been completed, the cavalrymen on guard reported that large reinforcements of cavalry and infantry sent by the king were on their way to Utica; at the same time a great cloud of dust was seen, and, in a short time, the front of the column was in sight. Surprised by this new development, Curio sent out the cavalry to receive and retard the initial onset; he himself quickly withdrew the legions from their work and drew up a battle-line. The cavalry joined battle, and before the legions could be deployed and take up their position, the king's entire forces, because they had been marching in a disorderly fashion and without any apprehension, were encircled and thrown into confusion, and they took to flight, but (while) almost all of their cavalry (were) unharmed because they retreated quickly along the shore into the town, a large number of their infantry were killed. 

Chapter 27.  

On the following night two Marsian centurions from  Curio's camp deserted to Attius Varus with twenty-two of their fellow-soldiers. Whether they were expressing to him the view that they really had or were just gratifying his ears - for we readily believe the things that we want (to hear), and we hope that others feel what we feel ourselves - at any rate they assured (him) that the minds of the whole army were alienated from Curio, and that there was a very great need (for him) to come face to face with their army and that he should give (them) a chance of talking (with him). Convinced by this opinion, Varus led his legions out of their camp early the next day. Curio did the same, and each drew up his forces with one small valley coming between (them).

 Chapter 28.

There was in Varus' army (one) Sextus Quintilus Varus, who it has been mentioned above, had been at Corfinium, After his release by Caesar, he had come to Africa, and Curio had brought across those legions, which Caesar had taken over at Corfinium, in such a way that the ranks and companies were still the same, although a few centurions had been changed. Taking this (as) a reason to address (them), Quintilius began to go around Curio's lines and beseech the soldiers not to lose (all) recollection of their first (military) oath which they had sworn to Domitius and to himself (as) quaestor, not to bear arms against those who had experienced the same fortune and endured the same (hardships) in a siege (as they had), nor fight for those, by whom they had been insultingly called deserters. To this he added a few (words) in the hope of inducement, (concerning) what they should expect from his own liberality, if they were to follow him and Attius. After this speech had been delivered, no response of any kind was made from Curio's army, and the two (generals) took their forces back (to camp).  

Chapter 29.

Then a great fear came upon the minds of everyone in Curio's camp; this was rapidly intensified by the men's various remarks. When this had spread from one author to several (persons) and was passed from one to another, there seemed to be many authors of this view. (It was) a civil war; (they were) a type of men, to whom it was permitted to act freely and to follow whichever (party) they wished; these (were) legions, which (but) a short time before had been among their adversaries; for the manner in which it was offered had even affected Caesar's generosity; the townships were even joined together (by men) from different regions, for they came from the Marsi and the Paeligni, as they had been in tents (as) fellow-soldiers on the previous night; several of the soldiers' conversations were full of rather painful (stories); uncertainty was poorly received, (and) several (of these stories) were invented by those who wished to appear more zealous.  (N.B. Because of the corruption of the Latin text it is impossible to translate this chapter with any degree of confidence.) 

Chapter 30.

For these reasons, he (i.e. Curio) convoked a council (of war) and began to deliberate on the whole situation. (Some) were of the opinion that they should vote to attempt an attack upon Varus' camp by all (possible) means, because they thought that, with the minds of the men in this (sort of) mood, idleness was the greatest danger. Finally, they said it was better to try the fortunes of war through courage in battle than to be abandoned and betrayed by their own (men) and to have to endure the gravest punishment. There were (those) who thought they should withdraw to Castra Cornelia in the third watch (i.e. during the small hours), so that, after a longer interval of time had intervened, the minds of the men might be healed, (and,) at the same time, if anything untoward should befall (them), a safer and easier retreat might be granted (to them) through the large number of their ships.  

Chapter 31.

Curio rejected both of their counsels and said that one proposal was lacking in spirit, and that the other showed an excess of it; the latter were contemplating some kind of disgraceful flight, and the former thought that they should fight in an unfavourable position. "For with what assurance," he said, "can we rely on it being possible for a camp to be stormed (that is) fortified both by works and by the nature of its position? Indeed, what do we gain if we withdraw from an attack on the camp after we have received great losses? As if it is not the case that a successful campaign earns the good-will of an army towards its commanders and failure its hatred! But what would a change of camp amount to other than an ignominious flight and a giving up of all hope and the alienation of the army? For those with a sense of honour ought not to suspect that they are not trusted enough, nor should the rebellious know that they are feared, because our fear would enhance the licentiousness of the latter and diminish the zeal of the former. But if," says he, "we have now had these (reports) investigated, in which (rumours) of disaffection within the army are spoken of, (rumours) which I certainly believe to be false or, at at any rate less (serious) than they are made out (to be), how much better it would be for these (rumours) to be covered up and concealed, (rather) than that they should be confirmed by our (conduct). Should not the troubles of the army be kept hidden like wounds of the body, so as not to increase the hopes of our enemies? But (some) also add that we should set out in the middle of the night, by which means, I suppose, they should have greater scope to attempt to commit misdemeanours. For behaviour of such a kind is (usually) held in check either by (a sense of) shame or by fear, which feelings the night is very much inclined to block. Therefore, I am neither so reckless that I should give my opinion that we should attack their camp without any hope (of success), nor so timid as to lack (all) hope, and I do think that everything should first be tried, and I am, to a great extent, certain that I shall form the (same) judgment as you concerning this matter." 

Chapter 32.

Having dismissed the council, he (i.e. Curio) summoned an assembly of his troops. He reminded (them) how Caesar had made use of their zeal at Corfinium, so that, through their good-will and example, he had won over a great part of Italy to his (cause). "For," he said. "all the townships subsequently followed you and your actions, and (it was) not without (good) reason (that) Caesar thought so very well of you, and his enemies (felt) so very harshly (towards you). For Pompeius, although defeated in no battle, departed from Italy because he had become unsettled by the precedent (established) by your conduct; Caesar has entrusted me, whom he considered his dearest (friend), (and) the provinces of Sicily and Africa, without which the City and Italy cannot be protected, to your good keeping. But there are (some) who are encouraging you to desert from us. For what is more desirable to them than to betray us, and, at the same time, to involve you in a heinous crime? Or what worse (fate) could they conceive for you than that you should betray those who believe that they owe everything to you, (and) fall into the power of those who think that they have been ruined through you? But have you not heard of the things Caesar has achieved in Spain, that he has routed two armies, conquered two generals, (and) recovered two provinces, (and) that (all) these (things) have been done within forty days of the time when Caesar had come into sight of his opponents? Can (those) who were not able to withstand (him), (when they were) unharmed, resist (him now that they are) ruined? Are you (who) followed Caesar, when victory was uncertain, really going to follow the loser now that the fortune of war has been decided, (and) when you ought to be reaping the rewards of your services? For they say that they (were) deserted and betrayed by you, and they make mention of your former oath. But (did) you (desert) Lucius Domitius, or did Domitius desert you? Did he not forsake (you, when you were) prepared to endure extreme hardship? Did he not seek his own safety by secretly running away from you? Were you not betrayed by him and preserved through Caesar's generosity? How, indeed, could he hold you to your oath, when he had thrown down his symbols of office and laid aside his command, and had, himself, come into the power of another as a private citizen and a captive? A new obligation is left (to your conscience), by which you should neglect that oath by which you are bound, and have regard for the one which was invalidated by your general's surrender and by the loss of his civil rights. But, I suppose, if you approve of Caesar, you take offence at me. I am not going to boast of my services to you, which are still less than my inclination and your expectation; but yet soldiers have always sought the rewards of their labours at the outcome of a war, and what it is going to be, not even you can doubt. Why, indeed, should I omit my own diligence, or my (good) fortune with regard to how far our affairs have as yet progressed? Do you regret that I transported the army safe and sound with not a single ship being lost? That, on my arrival, I routed the enemy's fleet at the first encounter? That twice in two days I defeated (them) in a cavalry battle? That I took two hundred of the enemy's merchant ships out of the harbour and the bay, and forced them (to join us) here, so that they could not receive the help of supplies either by land or in ships? You are rejecting such (good) fortune and such leaders, (and) you are following (those responsible for) the debacle at Corfinium, the flight from Italy, and the surrender of the Spanish (provinces), (all of these) precedents for the war in Africa! I, for my part, wished that I should be called a soldier of Caesar; you hailed me with the name of 'imperator'. If you regret this, restore my name to me, lest you should seem to have given (me) the honour as an insult." 

Chapter 33.

The soldiers, upset by this speech, frequently interrupted (him), even as he was speaking, as they seemed to be bearing the suspicion of disloyalty with great anguish, and, indeed, as he was leaving the meeting they all urged (him) to be of a strong mind, and not to hesitate to join battle and put their loyalty and courage to the test. Since the inclination and the view of (them) all had been changed by this action, Curio decided with the consent of his (men) that, whenever the opportunity was first offered (to him), he would entrust (the issue) to battle, and, on the following day, he led (his men) out and arranged (them) in battle order in the same place where he had stationed them on the preceding days. Nor indeed did Attius Varus hesitate to lead out his forces, whether the situation was offered (to him) of suborning our soldiers or of engaging in a favourable position, lest he should lose the opportunity (of doing so).    

Chapter 34.

There was, as has been mentioned above (i.e. in Ch. 27), a valley between the two battle-lines, not so deep but difficult and steep to climb. Each side was waiting (to see) whether the forces of their adversaries would attempt to cross it, so that they might join battle in a more favourable position. At the same time, on the left wing, the whole of Publius Attius' cavalry and a good many light-armed troops, (that were) intermingled with them, were perceived when they descended into the valley. Curio sent the cavalry and two cohorts of the Marrucini (i.e. a tribe of central Italy) to (meet) them; the enemy's cavalry failed to withstand their first onset, but spurred on their horses and fled back to their own (lines); abandoned by those who had charged along with them, the light-armed troops were surrounded and slain by our (men). The whole of Varus' army turned around in that direction, and saw their (men) fleeing and being cut down. Then Rebilus, Caesar's lieutenant, whom Curio had brought with him from Sicily, because he was aware that he had great experience in military matters, said, "You see the enemy (are) terrified, Curio; why do you hesitate to take advantage of the opportunity provided by this moment?" He (i.e. Curio) said only that his men should should keep in mind those (things) they had professed to him on the previous day, (and then) he ordered them to follow him and charged ahead in front of (them) all. The valley was (so) difficult to climb that those in front could not easily clamber up unless they were supported from below by their (comrades). But the minds of Attius' soldiers were so preoccupied by their fear and with the flight and slaughter of their (comrades) that they had no thought at all of any resistance, and (indeed) they believed that they had all been surrounded already by our cavalry. And so, before a (single dart) could be thrown or any of our (men) could come near them, all of Varus' army turned their backs and retreated to their camp. 

Chapter 35.

During this flight, a certain Fabius, a Paelignian (soldier) from the lowest ranks of Curio's army, while pursuing the head of the retreating column, began searching for Varus and calling (him) by name in a loud voice (in such a manner) that he appeared to be one of his own soldiers and to be wishing to speak (to him) and to warn (him) of something. When, after he had been called several times, he stopped and looked at (him), and asked (him) who he was and what he wanted, he aimed a blow at his bare shoulder with his sword, and came very close to killing Varus; but he avoided the danger by raising his shield to (block) the attempted (blow). Fabius was (then) surrounded by the nearby soldiers and cut down. The gates of the camp were thronged and the passageway blocked by the numerous crowd of fleeing (troops), and more (of them) perished in that place without a wound (i.e. they were crushed to death) than in battle or in the retreat, nor were they very far from being expelled from the camp, and several (of them) hurried straight on in the same direction into the town (i.e. Utica). But, when the nature of the ground and the fortifications of the camp prevented their access, then, because Curio's men had marched out (prepared) for battle, they were lacking those pieces of equipment which were necessary for an assault on a camp. So, Curio led his men back to camp with all his (men) except Fabius, while, of the number of the enemy, about six hundred were killed and a thousand wounded; on Curio's departure, all of these, and many (others) in addition, on the pretence of being wounded, withdrew from the camp into the town on account of their fear. Having observed this situation and being aware of his army's terror, Varus left a trumpeter in the camp and a few tents for the sake of appearances, and led his army back into the town in silence during the third watch (i.e. the small hours of the morning).

Chapter 36. 

On the following day, Curio began to besiege Utica and to surround it with a rampart. The populace in the town was unaccustomed to war, due to a long period of peace. On account of certain favours of Caesar towards them, the inhabitants of Utica were very well disposed to him; their community (of Roman citizens) was composed of different elements, (and) there was considerable anxiety on account of the earlier battles. And so they all began to speak openly now of surrender, and they urged Publius Attius not to seek to jeopardise the fortunes of all (of them) through his own obstinacy. While these matters were under discussion, messengers, sent ahead by king Juba, arrived to say that he was on his way with large forces and to encourage (them) to guard and defend their city. This news gave fresh strength to their most anxious minds. 

5.  Curio's last stand (Chapters 37-44).

Chapter 37.

The same information was reported to Curio, but for sometime he could not give (it) credence; (for) he had such great confidence in his own affairs. And at this time, Caesar's successes in Spain were brought to Africa by messengers and dispatches. (He was) elated by all these reports, and did not think that the king would try anything against him. But, when he learned from a reliable authority that his forces were less than twenty-five miles away from Utica, he abandoned the siege-works and withdrew to Castra Cornelia. Here he began to lay up corn, to fortify the camp, and to gather timber, and he immediately sent (orders) to Sicily that the two legions and the rest of the cavalry should be sent to him. His camp was highly suitable for conducting a campaign, from the nature and strength of the site, from its proximity to the sea, and from the abundance of water and salt, of which a great quantity had already been gathered from the neighbouring salt-pits. There could be no lack of timber, due to the large amount of trees, nor corn, of which the fields were very full. And so, with the consent of all his (men), Curio prepared to await the rest of his forces and to prolong the war.   

Chapter 38.

These arrangements having been decided and his plans approved, he heard from some deserters from the town that Juba had remained in his kingdom, having been recalled by a border war and troubles with the people of Leptis (i.e. Leptis Minor, a town on the east coast of the province of Africa, between Hadrumetum and Thapsus), and that his commander Saburra, (who had been) sent with a rather small force, was approaching Utica. Rashly believing these informants, he altered his plans and resolved to settle the issue in battle. His youth, his courageous spirit, the outcome of earlier situations, and his confidence in waging war successfully greatly helped to approve this decision. Induced by these factors, he sent all his cavalry at the beginning of the night to the enemy's camp by the river Bagradas. Saburra, of whom he had heard before, was its commander, but the king was following on with all his forces, and had halted at a distance of six miles from Saburra. The cavalry (that had been) sent accomplished the journey at night, and made an attack upon their naive and unsuspecting enemy. For the Numidians, in accordance with some barbarian custom, had encamped here and there without any formation. They fell upon them, dispersed (as they were) and heavy with sleep, and killed a great number of them; many fled in panic. After this had happened, the cavalry returned to Curio and brought back some captives to him. 

Chapter 39.

Curio had set out with all of his forces at the third watch (i.e. in the small hours of the morning), having left five cohorts to guard the camp. When he had advanced six miles, he met the cavalry (and) learned of their successful action; he asked the prisoners who was in command of the camp at the Bagradas; they replied (that it was) Saburra. In his eagerness to complete the march, he omitted to ask any other (questions), and, looking back at the nearest ranks, he said, "Don't you see, men, that the prisoners' answer is in line with (the information provided by) the deserters? That the king is not there, (and) that the force he sent out was a small (one), which was not able to be a match for a few cavalrymen? Hasten then to (win) spoils and renown, so that we may now begin to think of your rewards and of the thanks we should give (you)." What the cavalry had achieved was significant in itself, especially when their small number was compared with so great a multitude of the Numidians. However, these (events) were related by themselves in an exaggerated manner, as men are naturally inclined to sing their own praises. Besides, many spoils were displayed and the captured cavalrymen were brought forward, so it seemed that, whatever time intervened, all this would delay their victory. So, the zeal of his soldiers did not fail the hopes of Curio. He ordered the cavalry to follow him, and hastened his march, so that he could attack (them), while they were (still) panic-stricken from their flight. But they (i.e. the cavalry), exhausted by their long all-night journey, could not keep up, and came to a halt, some in one place, some in another. (But), not even this occurrence impaired Curio in his expectations.   

Chapter 40.

When Juba was informed by Saburra of the nocturnal battle, he sent Saburra two thousand Spanish and Gallic cavalrymen, whom he had been accustomed to keep around him as his (personal body-)guard, and that part of his infantry on which he most greatly relied; he himself followed more slowly with the rest of his forces and sixty elephants. Suspecting that Curio, having sent his cavalry ahead, would (soon) be present himself, Saburra drew up his forces of cavalry and infantry, and ordered them to give way gradually and fall back under the pretence of fear, and that he would give (them) such orders as he felt the situation required. Curio, his view of the present situation being added to his earlier confidence, thought that the enemy were in retreat, and brought his forces down from the higher ground on to the plain. 

Chapter 41.  

When he had advanced a fairly long way from this place, (about) sixteen miles in distance, and his army was by that time worn out by their exertions, he halted. Saburra gave his (men) the signal, and formed his battle-line and began going around the ranks and encouraging (them). But (keeping) his infantry at a distance, he used (them) only for show, (and) sent his cavalry into battle. Curio was not found wanting in this situation (i.e. he rose to the occasion), and encouraged his (men) to repose all their confidence in their courage. Nor did his soldiers, though weary, nor his cavalry, though few (in number) and exhausted by their labour, lack any zeal and valour for the fighting; but they were (only) two hundred in number, (as) the rest had stopped on the journey. Wherever they charged, they forced the enemy to give ground, but they could not pursue (them) very far as they fled, nor spur their horses on too forcefully. Now the enemy's cavalry began to outflank our battle-line on both wings and to trample down those in our rear. When any of our cohorts ran forward from the battle-line, the Numidians, fresh (as they were), would escape our charge due to their speed, and (then) surround our men as they were seeking to return again to the ranks, and cut (them) off from the battle-line. So it did not seem safe either to remain in their position and keep their ranks, or to charge forward and take a chance. The enemy's forces were frequently increased (in number) by reinforcements sent by the king; the strength began to fail our (men) due to their fatigue, (and,) at the same time, those who had received wounds could neither leave the battle-line nor be taken to  a place of safety, because the whole line was surrounded and held back by the enemy's cavalry. Despairing of their own safety, as men are wont to do in the last moment of their lives, they either lamented their own death, or, if fortune should save any (of them) from this peril, they commended their parents (to them). Everything was full of fear and grief.        

Chapter 42.

When Curio realised that neither his exhortations nor his pleas were being heeded at all by his terrified (men), he thought that there was one hope of safety left (to them) in their wretched circumstances, and he ordered (them) as a body to take the nearby hills and to convey the standards there. (But) some cavalry, sent by Saburra also, took them first. Then indeed did our (men) fall into  a state of the utmost despair, and some were killed by their cavalry as they tried to escape, and others fell to the ground unharmed. His cavalry commander, Gnaeus Domitius, surrounding Curio with a few horsemen, urged (him) to seek safety in flight and make his way to the camp, and he promised that he would not desert him. But Curio declared that, having lost the army which he had accepted when (it was) committed to his charge by Caesar, he would never appear again in his sight, and so he died fighting. Very few of the cavalrymen got away from the battle, but those at the tail of the column, whom we have stated (i.e. see Ch. 39) had stopped for the sake of refreshing their horses, having perceived the rout of the whole army, retired to their camp in safety. The infantrymen were all killed to a man. 

Chapter 43.

Having heard of these events, the quaestor Marcius Rufus, (who had been) left behind in the camp by Curio, exhorted his (men) not to lose heart. They begged and entreated that they should be taken back to Sicily in their ships. (This) he promised (to do), and he ordered the ships' masters to bring the boats in to land on the shore by early evening. But so great was the general terror that some said that Juba's forces were present, some that Varus was hard on their heels with his legions, although none of these things had happened at all, (and) others suspected that the enemy's fleet was about to swoop swiftly down on (them). And so, amid the general terror, each (man) sought to consult his own (interests). (Those) who were on board ship were hastening to set sail. Their flight spurred on the masters of the transport vessels; a few skiffs assembled to (do) their duty and (obey) their orders. But on the crowded shores the struggle (to determine) who out of this vast number should be most able to embark was so great that several (vessels) were sunk by the weight of the multitude, (and) the rest were deterred from coming too close by the fear of this. 

Chapter 44.

As a result of these things, it happened that (only) a few soldiers and fathers of families, who prevailed either through (personal) influence or compassion, or (who) could swim to the ships, were taken on board and reached Sicily in safety. The rest of the troops sent some centurions to Varus at night as a group of delegates and surrendered themselves to him. The next day Juba caught sight of their cohorts of soldiers in front of the town, and, claiming (them) to be his booty, he ordered a great number of them to be killed and sent back a chosen few to his kingdom, (and,) although Varus protested that his good faith had been broken by him, he did not dare to resist. He, himself, (i.e. Juba) rode into the town on horseback, attended by several senators, among which number were Servius Sulpicius and Licinius Damasippus, (and) in a few days decided and gave instructions as to what he wanted done in Utica, and then after a few days more he returned to his kingdom with all his forces.  


 






 






  





 



Thursday 15 October 2020

CAESAR: "DE BELLO CIVILI": BOOK I: THE STRUGGLE BEGINS

Introduction:

Sabidius translated the Third Book of the "De Bello Civili" as long ago as 5th November 2013 and before the other two written by Caesar, because it contains an account of the great battle of Pharsalus, which was the key event of the Civil War. Sabidius has now returned to this work and has translated below the First Book, which begins with an account of how the War broke out, of Caesar's initial successes when he advanced into Italy at the beginning of 49 B.C. and how Pompey managed to escape to Illyricum with his army; after that he writes of the siege of Massilia which he is obliged to conduct. However, the second half of the Book (Chapters 37-87) consists of a detailed account of his campaign against Pompey's forces in Spain, which he felt he had to confront before he could pursue Pompey across the Adriatic. Led by Pompey's experienced lieutenants, Afranius and Petreius, these forces provide Caesar with significant opposition, and Caesar follows his usual practice of not understating the strength of his opponents and the problems and dilemmas he has to face, so that when victory comes, it appears all the  more laudable. 

The reader is recommended to read the full introduction to Sabidius' translation of Book III, which discusses at some length the nature and the virtues of Caesar's "Commentarii." However, in this translation of Book I, he does not follow his previous practice of specially highlighting Caesar's use of Ablative Absolutes or, in order to demonstrate his heavy reliance on Reported Speech, his main verbs. In the former case, this is because he has concluded that, while literal translations of Ablative Absolutes may be of assistance to a reader, who is trying to translate the Latin accurately, it is often unnecessarily clumsy to retain such literal translations in English, particularly when they involve the use of the Passive Voice. Furthermore, the ability to translate an Ablative Absolute into effective English is surely a key part of the task of translating Latin well. Nevertheless, with this obvious exception, in his translation of Caesar's "De Bello Civili" Book I, Sabidius has not strayed very far from his usual mission of seeking to stick as closely as possible to the structure of the Latin sentence and the actual Latin words used. Here, he quotes from his introduction to Book III, where he writes: "It is Sabidius' belief that colloquial or free translations of the Latin original into allegedly more agreeable everyday English can distort the author's intended meaning with only a very marginal benefit being offered in terms of the accessibility of the English."         

1. Intransigence at Rome (Chapters 1-6).


Chapter 1.  Gaius (Julius) Caesar's dispatch (i.e. this had said that Caesar would give up his command if Pompey would do the same) having been delivered to the consuls by Fabius (n.b. here the manuscript is in error; it was actually delivered by Gaius Scribonius Curio), it was grudgingly accepted by them after the strong representations of the tribunes of the people that it should be read in the senate, but their permission could not be obtained that (the contents) of the dispatch should be referred to the senate (for discussion). (Instead) the consuls initiated a general (debate) on the (state of) the republic. The consul, Lucius (Cornelius) Lentulus (Crus), promised that he would not fail in his duty to the republic, if they were prepared to state their opinions courageously and vigorously; but if they were concerned about Caesar and sought his favour, as they had done on previous occasions, (then he said) that he would adopt his own policy, and would not comply with the senate's authority; (and he reminded them) that he too had (the capacity) to return to Caesar's favour and friendship. (Quintus Caecilus Metellus Pius) Scipio (Nasica) (i.e. cos. suff. 52 B.C.) spoke in the same vein: (he said that,) with regard to Pompey (i.e. Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus, cos. i. 70), there would be no wanting in his duty to the republic, if the senate would follow (him); (but,) if it hesitated and acted too mildly, (then) the senate would ask for his help in vain, if they should want (it) afterwards. 

Chapter 2.  As the (meeting of) the senate was being held in the city and Pompey was (living) nearby, this speech of Scipio's seemed to be coming from the mouth of Pompey himself. Some expressed their opinion in milder terms, like, in the first instance, Marcus (Claudius) Marcellus (i.e. cos. 51), who launched into a speech (declaring that a decision) on this matter ought not to be referred to the senate until a levy (had been) held throughout Italy and armies had been enrolled, under whose protection the senate might venture to pass whatever (decrees) it wished in safety and in freedom; (and) like Marcus Calidius, who was of the opinion that Pompey should set out for his provinces (i.e. in Spain), so that there should not be any cause for hostilities, (and thought) that Caesar was afraid that Pompey appeared to be holding on to the two legions which had been taken from him and to be retaining them near the city, to his detriment; (and also) like Marcus (Caelius) Rufus, who supported Calidius' motion with just a few words altered. (But) they were all attacked and censured by the reprimand of the  consul Lucius Lentulus. Lentulus refused altogether to put Calidius' motion to the vote, (and) Marcellus, alarmed by these reproofs, withdrew his motion. So, compelled by the tirades of the consul, the terror of a nearby army, (and) by the threats of Pompey's friends, the majority (of the senate), reluctantly and under pressure, supported Scipio's motion: (namely) that Caesar should disband his army before a day to be fixed; if he should not do (so), it should be considered that he would be acting against the state. Marcus Antonius and Quintus Cassius (Longinus), tribunes of the people, (then) interposed their vetoes. There was an immediate debate on (this use of) the tribunes' veto. Harsh views were expressed; and whoever spoke with the most acrimony and the most vindictiveness, so he was most highly applauded by Caesar's enemies. 

Chapter 3.  When the senate had been dismissed towards evening, all who were of that order were summoned by Pompey. He praised those who arrived promptly, and encouraged them with regard to the future; those who were more tardy, he reproved and urged (them) on. From all directions many were called out from Pompey's former armies by the hope of rewards and advancement, and many were sent for from the two legions which had been handed over by Caesar. The city and the comitium itself (i.e. the place of assembly, adjacent to the forum, where the Roman people met to vote) were filled with tribunes, centurions, (and) veteran volunteers. All the friends of the consuls, (and) the adherents of Pompey and of those who bore old grudges against Caesar, gathered together in the senate, (5) and the weaker (sort) were terrified, the waverers had their minds made up, and the power to decide in true freedom was taken from the majority, by their declarations and their uproar. The censor, Lucius (Calpurnius) Piso (Caesoninus) (i.e. cos. 58) offered to go to Caesar himself, and the praetor Lucius Roscius (Fabatus) likewise, to acquaint him with these circumstances;  they asked for a period of six days to complete their mission. The view was also expressed by others that delegates should be sent to Caesar, to announce to him the will of the senate. 

Chapter 4.  There was resistance to all these (proposals), and there was opposition to all of them in speeches by the consul (i.e. Lentulus), by Scipio, and by (Marcus Porcius) Cato (i.e. praetor 53). Old grievances concerning Caesar and resentment at his (electoral) rejection incited Cato. Lentulus was motivated by the size of his debts, and by the prospect of an army, and provinces, and the bribes of rulers requiring recognition of their titles, and he boasted among his (friends) that he would be a second Sulla (i.e. Lucius Cornelius Sulla Felix, dictator 82-79), to whom supreme power should revert. The same hopes of a province and armies, which he thought he would share with Pompey, by virtue of (his being) a relative (i.e. Pompey was his son-in-law, having married his daughter Cornelia in 53 B.C.), impelled Scipio, besides his fear of prosecutions, and his vanity, and his desire to flatter those powerful (men) who held considerable sway at that time in the state and the law-courts. Pompey, himself, encouraged by Caesar's enemies and because he wished no one to be equal with him in prestige, had totally withdrawn himself from his friendship (with him), and had achieved a reconciliation with their common enemies, the majority of whom he himself had inflicted upon Caesar at the time of their marriage alliance (i.e.  in 59 B.C. Pompey had married Caesar's daughter Julia); moreover, (as he was) perturbed by the discredit arising from the two legions which he had diverted from the expedition to Asia and Syria for the purposes of his own power and dominance, he was determined that the situation should be settled by (force of) arms.

Chapter 5.  For these reasons, everything was done in haste and confusion. No opportunity was given to those close to Caesar to inform him (of these events), nor to the tribunes of the people to protest about their own danger, nor even to preserve their most fundamental right, which Lucius Sulla has left (them), the authority conferred (on them) by the veto, but on the seventh day they were compelled to think of their own safety, whereas in former times even the most turbulent of the tribunes of the people had managed (not) to consider (themselves) at risk until the end of the eighth month of their official duties. Recourse is had to that extreme and ultimate decree of the senate, which had never been resorted to before, except by the daring of its proposers in (circumstances when) the city was on the very point of destruction, and when there was desperation about everyone's safety: 'let the consuls, praetors, tribunes of the people, and (those) who are in the vicinity of the city as proconsuls, take care that the republic should suffer no harm.' These (words) were recorded in a decree of the senate on the seventh day before the Ides of January (i.e. 7th January); and so on the first five days on which the senate could meet from the day on which Lentulus entered his consulate, the two days of elections excepted, the severest and the most virulent decrees were passed with regard to the government of Caesar and those most eminent of men, the tribunes of the people. At once, the tribunes of the people fled from the city and went to Caesar. At that time, he was at Ravenna, and he was awaiting a response to his own most moderate demands, (to see) if by some equitable (act) on the part of those men the matter could be brought to a peaceful (resolution). 

Chapter 6.  During the following days, the senate was convened outside the city. Pompeius emphasised the same things, which he had indicated by means of Scipio, he applauded the courage and firmness of the senate, and he revealed (the extent of) his forces: (he told them) that he had ten legions ready: moreover, he was aware and had been informed that his soldiers were estranged in their minds against Caesar, nor could they be persuaded to defend him or to follow (him into battle). At once, (motions) were referred to the senate on other matters: (that) levies should be held throughout Italy, (that) Faustus (Cornelius) Sulla should be sent to Mauretania as propraetor; that money should be granted to Pompey from the public treasury. It was also proposed that, with regard to king Juba, he should be (honoured with the title of) ally and friend (of the Roman people.) (But Gaius Claudius) Marcellus (i.e. Lentulus' colleague as consul) said that he would not allow (this) at present; (Lucius Marcius) Philippus, a tribune of the people blocked (the appointment of) Faustus. On the other matters decrees of the senate were recorded. Provinces, two (of them) consular, the remainder praetorian, were allotted to private (individuals). Syria fell to Scipio, Gaul to Lucius Domitius (Ahenobarbus), (i.e. cos. 56). (Lucius Marcius) Philippus (i.e. cos. 56 and father of the tribune mentioned above) and (Lucius Aurelius) Cotta (i.e. cos. 67), were passed over by a private stratagem, nor were their lots (even) admitted. To the remaining provinces praetors were sent. Nor did they wait, as had happened in previous years, for (the assignment) of their commands to be referred to the people (for ratification), and to depart (from the city) in military garb, once their vows had been formally offered. (Both) consuls left the city, (something) which had never happened before that time, and private (citizens) had lictors in the city and on the Capitol, contrary to all precedents of former times. Levies were held throughout Italy, arms were requisitioned, money was exacted from municipal towns and removed from temples, (and) all divine and human rights were confounded.

2.  Caesar reacts (Chapters 7-15).

Chapter 7.  Having acquired a knowledge of these events, Caesar (gathered) his men around (him and) addressed (them). He related to them the wrongs (done to him) by his enemies at all times; he complained that Pompey, whose honour and dignity he himself had always favoured and been a supporter of, (had been) led astray and corrupted by them through envy and a belittling of his glory. He complained that a new precedent (had been) introduced into the (affairs of) the republic, (namely) that the tribunician power of veto, which in previous years had been restored by (force of) arms, had (now) been forbidden and suppressed by (force of) arms. (He said) that, although Sulla had stripped the tribunician function of (almost) all its powers, he had, nevertheless, left the power of veto unrestrained, (but) that Pompey, who was thought to have restored (the powers they had) lost, had even deprived them of the privileges which they had formerly kept. That, whenever it had been decreed 'that the magistrates should take care that the republic should suffer no harm', by which words and by which decree of the senate the Roman people had been called to arms, (it had only been) passed in (the circumstances of) pernicious laws, of tribunician violence, and of the secession of the people, when the temples and the loftier sites had been occupied; and he told (them) that these examples of former times had been atoned for by the fates of Saturninus (i.e. Lucius Appuleius Saturninus, d. 100) and the Gracchi (i.e. Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, d. 133, and Gaius Sempronius Gracchus d. 121); that nothing of such a kind (had) happened at that time, nor had it even been considered; no law (had been) promulgated, no appeal involving the people (had been) put in motion, no secession (had been) organised. He exhorted (them) to defend from his enemies the reputation and honour of that general, under whose leadership they had for nine years supported the republic with the greatest of good fortune, and had fought countless successful battles, (and) had pacified the whole of Gaul and Germany. The men of the Thirteenth Legion, which was present - for, at the beginning of the troubles, he had summoned it, (while) the others had not yet joined (them)  -  exclaimed that they were ready to defend their general and the tribunes of the people from any injuries.

Chapter 8.  Once the disposition of his men had become clear (to him), he set out for Ariminum with this legion and there he met the tribunes of the people who had fled to him; he summoned the remaining legions from their winter quarters and ordered (them) to follow (him) closely.  The young Lucius (Julius) Caesar, whose father had been Caesar's legate (i.e. Lucius Julius Caesar, cos. 64) came there. Having completed the rest of his conversation on the business for which he had come, he revealed that he had a message to him from Pompey concerning their personal relationship: (he said) that Pompey wished that he should be cleansed in Caesar's (eyes) lest he should see those things which he had done for the sake of the republic as a personal affront. (For) he had always considered the interests of the state as more important than the claims of personal connections. Caesar, too, for the sake of his own reputation, ought to subordinate his own desires and (sense of) resentment to the (good of) the republic, and not be so violently angry with his enemies, that, although he might hope that he would (only) hurt his enemies, he might (also) do harm to the republic. He added a few (words) in the same vein, with a excuse relating to Pompey. The praetor Roscius conferred with Caesar on the same subject and in almost the same words, and emphasised that Pompey had asked him (to do so). 

Chapter 9.  Although these things appeared to have done nothing to alleviate his injuries, yet, having obtained proper persons through whom he might convey what he wanted to him, he asked both of them, since they had conveyed Pompey's requirements to him, not to object to passing his own demands to him also, (to see) if with a little trouble they could put an end to a great dispute and free all Italy from fear.(He said) that his prestige had always been his foremost (consideration), and (was) more important than his life. He was greatly pained because the favour of the Roman people was being wrested from him through ill-treatment by his enemies, and (because), a half-year's command having been taken from (him), he was being dragged back to the city, (even though) the people had ordered that account should be taken of his (standing) in his absence at the next (consular) elections. Yet, he had borne this loss of his honour for the sake of the republic; (but,) when he sent letters to the senate (asking) that all (commanders) should give up their armies, he did not even attain that. (He complained) that levies were being held throughout Italy, that the two legions which had been taken from him under the pretence of a Parthian war had been kept (at home), and that the state was in arms. To where do all these (things) lead, other than to his ruin? But, (he was) still prepared to submit to everything and to endure everything for the sake of the republic. Let Pompey go to his own provinces, let them both disband their armies, let everyone in Italy lay down their arms, let fear be removed from the city, let free elections and (the conduct of) the republic be entrusted to the senate and people of Rome. So that these things may be performed the more easily and on fixed terms, and so that they may be confirmed by the swearing of an oath, let either (Pompey) himself draw near or allow (Caesar) to go to meet him; if this were to happen, all our disputes would be settled through discussion. 

Chapter 10.  This message having been received, Roscius went with (Lucius) Caesar to Capua, and there he found the consuls and Pompey; he reported Caesar's demands. Having deliberated upon the matter, they replied, and sent back to him by the same (persons) written instructions, the gist of which was this: Caesar should return to Gaul, leave Ariminum, (and) disband his army; if he were to do these (things), Pompey would go to Spain. Meanwhile, until security was given that Caesar would do what he promised, the consuls and Pompey would not suspend their levies. 

Chapter 11.  It was an inequitable arrangement to require that Caesar should leave Ariminum and return to his province, but that he himself (i.e. Pompey) should keep both his provinces and another man's legions; to desire that Caesar's army should be disbanded while he was holding levies; (and to say) that he should (merely) promise to go to his province, but not prescribe the day on which he would go, so that, (even) if he had not set out until after Caesar's consulate had expired, he would still not appear to be bound by any religious scruples concerning falsehood. But his failure to give a time for a conference, or to promise that he would set out (to meet him), brought great despair to (those hoping for) peace. Therefore, he (i.e. Caesar) sent Marcus Antonius with five cohorts from Ariminum to Arretium, (while) he himself remained at Ariminum with two (cohorts), and there he began to hold a levy; he took possession of Pisaurum, Fanum (and) Ancona, (each) with a single cohort. 

Chapter 12.  Meanwhile, having been informed that the praetor, (Quintus Minucius) Thermus was holding Iguvium with five cohorts, (and) was fortifying the town, but that the attitude of all the Iguvians was well-disposed towards himself, he sent Curio (there) with the three cohorts which he held at Pisaurum and Ariminum. When he learned of his approach, Thermus, suspicious of the mood of the citizens, withdrew his cohorts from the city and fled. His soldiers deserted him on the road and returned home. Curio recovered Iguvium with the full support of all (its inhabitants). On learning of these events, Caesar, relying on the good-will of the citizens, took the cohorts of the Thirteenth Legion from its garrison, and set out for Auximum; (Publius) Attius (Varus) (i.e. praetor 53) was holding this town with the cohorts which he brought into (it), and was holding a levy throughout Picenum by means of the senators which he sent around (it). 

Chapter 13.  When they heard of Caesar's approach, the town councillors of Auximum came to Attius Varus in a body; they told (him) that, (while) it was not a matter for them to determine, neither they, nor the rest of their citizens, could allow Gaius Caesar, a general who deserved (so) well of the republic, after performing such great achievements, to be shut out of their town and its walls; therefore he should have regard to the future and to the danger of his own (position). Disturbed by their declaration, Varus withdrew from the town the garrison which he had introduced, and fled. A few men from Caesar's front rank pursued him, and compelled (him) to halt. Battle having been joined, Varus is deserted by his (men), a number of his soldiers went home; the rest came over to Caesar, and their chief centurion, Lucius Pupius, was apprehended and brought along together with them, (a man) who had previously held the same rank in the army of Gnaeus Pompey. But Caesar commended Attius' soldiers, let Pupius go, gave thanks to the people of Auximum, and promised that he would remember their action.   

Chapter 14.  When these events were reported, so great a panic suddenly seized Rome, that, when the consul Lentulus came to open the treasury in order to supply money to Pompey in accordance with the senate's decree, as soon as he had opened the treasury reserve (i.e. this reserve, built up by a 5% tax on the freeing of slaves, was only supposed to be available in emergencies), he immediately fled from the city. For Caesar (was said) to be arriving at any moment, and his cavalry were falsely reported to be there (already). His colleague Marcellus and most of the magistrates followed him. Gnaeus Pompey had set out from the city on the previous day, and was making his way to the legions which he had taken from Caesar and had stationed in Apulia for the purpose of winter quarters. The levies around the city were suspended; nowhere on this side of Capua was thought to be at all secure. At Capua they first took courage and rallied, and they began to hold a levy of colonists who had been settled at Capua by the Julian law (i.e. the Lex Julia, passed during the consulship of Caesar in 59, had distributed unoccupied state lands, including those on the fertile Campanian plain, to needy citizens); Lentulus brought into the market-place gladiators whom Caesar had kept there in a training-school, and he confirmed (them) in their expectation of freedom and assigned horses to them and told (them) to follow him. (But) afterwards, having been advised by his friends that this action was censured by the judgment of everyone, he distributed them among the households of the district of Campania for the sake of security. 

Chapter 15.  Having left Auximum, Caesar hurried through the whole land of Picenum. All the prefectures in these districts received (him) with the most willing disposition and assisted his army in every respect. Envoys even came to him from Cingulum, a town which (Titus Atius) Labienus (i.e. Caesar's deputy in Gaul 58-49, but who was now returning to the service of Pompey) had founded and built at his own expense, and they promised that they would do with the utmost zeal whatever he commanded. He demanded soldiers; they sent (them). In the meantime, the Twelfth Legion came to join Caesar. With these two (legions of his) (i.e. the Twelfth and the Thirteenth, which he already had), he made for Asculum in Picenum. (Publius Cornelius) Lentulus Spinther (i.e. cos. 57) was occupying that town with ten cohorts; on learning of Caesar's approach, he fled from the town, and tried to take his cohorts with him, (but) he was deserted by a large part of his men. Abandoned on the road with a few (men), he fell in with (Lucius) Vibullius Rufus, (who had been) sent by Pompey to the land of Picenum in order to confirm (the loyalty) of its men.  Having been informed by him what things were going on in Picenum, Vibullius took his soldiers from him, and let (Spinther) himself go on his way. From the neighbouring regions, he also mustered what cohorts he could from Pompey's levies; among them he welcomed (Gaius) Lucilius Hirrus, (who was) fleeing from Camerinum with six cohorts, which he had had in the garrison there; collecting these together, he made up thirteen (cohorts). With these he made his way by forced marches to Domitius Ahenobarbus at Corfinium, and informed (him) that Caesar was close at hand with two legions. For his part, Domitius had collected about twenty cohorts from Alba, from the Marsi and the Paeligni, and from the neighbouring regions.  

3. The siege of Corfinium (Chapters 16-23).

When Firmum (i.e. a town on the Adriatic coast of Picenum) had been taken and Lentulus (i.e. Spinther) expelled, Caesar ordered that the soldiers who had deserted him should be rounded up, and that a levy should be established. Having delayed there for one day for the sake of (creating) a corn-supply, he himself hurried to Corfinium. When he arrived there, five cohorts, sent out from the town by Domitius, were (in the process of) demolishing a bridge over the river (i.e. the Aternus), which was about three miles from the town.  Having joined battle with Caesar's advance-guards, Domitius' men were speedily driven back from the bridge and retreated into the town. Having led his legions over (the river), Caesar halted before the town and set up camp close to the walls. 
    
Chapter 17.  When he learned of this, Domitius offered a large reward (to men) who were well acquainted with the region, and sent messages to Pompey in Apulia that begged and entreated (him) to come to his assistance; (he said) that Caesar could easily be trapped between their two armies and prevented from (obtaining) corn through the difficulties of the countryside. Unless he did this, he and more than thirty cohorts, and a large number of senators and Roman knights, would come into danger. In the meantime, he encouraged his (men) and positioned catapults on the walls, and assigned to each man certain areas of the city to guard; at an assembly he promised his troops (grants of) land from his own estates, (at the rate of) four acres to each one, and a proportionately (higher) share to centurions and re-enlisted veterans. 

Chapter 18.   In the meantime, word was brought to Caesar that the people of Sulmo (i.e. a Paelignian town, later the birth-place of the poet Ovid), which was a town seven miles distant from Corfinium, were eager to do whatever he wanted, but were prevented (from doing so) by Quintus Lucretius, a senator, and by Attius, a Paelignian, who were holding the town with a garrison of seven cohorts. He sent Marcus Antonius there with five cohorts of the Thirteenth Legion, and, as soon as the people of Sulmo saw our standards, they opened the gates, and all of them, both townsmen and soldiers, went out to meet Antonius with joy. Lucretius and Attius threw themselves from the walls. Brought before Antonius, Attius begged that he be sent to Caesar. Antonius, together with the cohorts and Attius, returned on the same day on which he had set out. Caesar joined these cohorts together with his own army, and released Attius unharmed. In (the course of) the first (few) days, Caesar resolved to fortify his camp with major works, and to bring in corn from the neighbouring municipal towns, and to await the rest of his forces. Within three days the Eighth Legion came to him there, and twenty-two cohorts from the fresh Gallic levies, and about three hundred cavalrymen from the king of Noricum (i.e. a territory between the Danube and the Alps). On their arrival, he set up a second camp on the other side of the town (i.e. Corfinium); he put Curio in charge of this camp. During the remaining days he undertook to surround the town with a rampart and redoubts. When the greatest part of this work had been completed, at almost the same time (those who had been) sent to Pompey returned. 

Chapter 19.  Having read through their dispatch, Domitius concealed (its content) and announced at his council (of officers) that Pompey was about to come speedily to their assistance, and he urged them not to lose heart and to prepare whatever (arrangements) were necessary to defend the town. He himself held a secret conference with a few of his intimate friends, and determined to effect a plan of escape. Since Domitius' countenance was not in line with his words, and he was doing everything with more anxiety and fearfulness than he had been accustomed (to do) in the previous days, and that, contrary to his usual custom, he was spending much (time) talking in secret with his friends for the purpose of planning, (and) was avoiding councils and meetings with his men, the situation could not be concealed or misrepresented  any longer. For Pompey had written back in reply that he would not be putting his cause into the greatest jeopardy, and that Domitius had transferred himself into the town of Corfinium without his advice or consent: therefore, if any opportunity should (arise), he should come to him with all his forces. (But) this could not be done, and this was the case because of the blockade and circumvallation of the town. 

Chapter 20. (Word of) Domitius' plans having spread about, the soldiers, who were in Corfinium, withdrew into groups in the early evening, and they expressed the following thoughts among themselves by means of their military tribunes, their centurions, and the most reputable of their own kind: they were being besieged by Caesar; his works and fortifications were nearly completed; their general, Domitius, in whom they had continued to place their hopes and trust, had abandoned (them) all and was arranging a plan of escape; they ought to have regard for their own safety. At first, the Marsi began to dissent from this (view), and they occupied that part of the town which seemed most defensible, and so violent a dispute arose between them, that they tried to engage in close combat and to fight it out with arms; after a short (time), however, mediators having been sent from one side to the other, they (i.e. the Marsi) learned about the flight of Lucius Domitius. Therefore, (they were) all of one opinion, and, having dragged Domitius into the public (view), they stood around (him) and kept (him) under guard, and they sent envoys from their own number to Caesar, (saying) they were ready to open the gates and to do whatever he might command, and that they would deliver Lucius Domitius alive into his power.  

Chapter 21.  When he became aware of these declarations, Caesar, although he thought it was of great importance that he should be master of the town and transfer its cohorts into his own camp as soon as possible, lest any change in their inclinations might occur through bribes, or through a renewal of their courage or false rumours, because in war great accidents are often brought about by trifling circumstances, yet, fearing that the town might be looted on the entry of his troops and due to the licence engendered by night-time, he commended those who had come (to him) and sent (them) back to the town and ordered the gates and walls to be secured. He, himself, stationed his men around those earth-works, which he had started to build, not spaced at fixed intervals, as had been his custom in previous days, but in a continuous (line) of sentries and guard-posts, so that they were in touching distance of one another and formed a complete circle around the fortification; he sent the military tribunes and officers around (the guard-posts), and exhorted (them) not only to be on their guard against sallies (from the town), but also to watch carefully for any stealthy exits of individual men. Indeed, not a single one of all (his men) was so slack or sluggish in his mind that he fell asleep that night. So keen was their anticipation of the final outcome that each one (of them) was carried off to a different subject in his heart and mind: what (would happen) to the Corfinians themselves, what (would happen) to Domitius, what (would happen) to Lentulus, what would happen to the rest (of them), and what events would overtake each one (of them)?

Chapter 22.  At about the fourth watch (i.e. towards the end of the night), Lentulus Spinther conversed from the walls with our sentries and guardsmen; (he said) that, if permission were given him, he wished to meet with Caesar. Permission having been given, he was escorted out of the town, nor did Domitius' men leave him until he was brought into Caesar's presence. He pleaded with him for his life, and implored (him) to spare him, and reminded (him) of their old friendship and acknowledged Caesar's kindnesses to him, which had been very great: that (it was) through him that he had been admitted into the college of pontiffs, that he had held the province of Spain after his praetorship, and that he had received support in his quest for the consulship. Caesar interrupted his speech: (he said) that he had not left his province for the sake of harming (anyone), but to protect himself from the assaults of his enemies, to restore to their dignity those tribunes of the people (who had been) expelled from the city on his account, and to liberate himself and the Roman people (who were being) oppressed by the faction of a few (men). Encouraged by his words, Lentulus sought leave to return to the town; (he said) that what he had obtained concerning his own safety would also be of comfort to the rest to hope for their own; some (of them) were so terrified that they were being driven to take desperate measures with regard to their own lives. He was given permission and departed. 

Chapter 23.  When it was light, Caesar ordered all the senators, senators' sons, military tribunes, and Roman knights to be brought before him. There were fifty (of them): of senatorial rank (there were) Lucius Domitius, Publius Lentulus Spinther, Lucius Caecilius Rufus, the quaestor Sextus Quintilius Varus, (and) Lucius Rubrius; in addition (there were) the son of Domitius, and several other young men, and a great number of Roman knights and councillors, whom Domitius had summoned from the municipal towns. When they were brought before (him), he protected them all from the jeers and taunts of the soldiers; he told them in a few words that he had not received any thanks on their part for the very great benefits (which) he (had bestowed) upon them; (then) he sent (them) all away unharmed. The six million sesterces, which Domitius had brought (there) and deposited in the public (treasury), (and which had been) brought to him by the magistrates of Corfinium, he returned to Domitius, lest he might appear to have been more sparing with regard to the lives of men than with regard to money (matters), although it was well known to be public money, (and to have been) given by Pompey as pay (for the troops). He ordered Domitius' soldiers to take the oath of allegiance to himself, and on that day, after spending even days in total at Corfimium, he made a regular days' march, and came to Apulia via the territories of the Marrucini, the Frentani (and) the Larinates.   

4. Pompey leaves Italy (Chapters 24-29). 

Chapter 24.  On learning of these events which had taken place at Corfinium, Pompey set out from Luceria to Canusium, and from there to Brundisium. He ordered all the forces (raised) from every quarter in the recent levies to join him; he armed slaves (and) shepherds, and assigned horses to them; from these  he made up about three hundred cavalrymen. The praetor Lucius Manlius (Torquatus) fled from Alba with six cohorts, (and likewise) the praetor (Publius) Rutilius Lupus from Tarracins with three; having caught sight, from a distance, of Caesar's cavalry, over which Vibius Curius was in command, they deserted their praetor and transferred their standards to Curius and went over to him. In the same way during the rest of his journey several cohorts fell in with Caesar's (infantry) column (and) others with his cavalry. Numerius Magius from Cremona, Gnaeus Pompey's chief engineer, (was) captured on the road and brought to him. Caesar sent him back to him with this message: since up to this moment there had been no opportunity for a conference, and he himself would be coming to Brundisium, (he believed) it was of great importance to the republic and to the common safety that he should  converse with Pompey; nor indeed could the same (effect) be achieved while there was a long distance of road (between them), when their proposals would be conveyed by others, as (it could) if there were a discussion of all their proposals face to face. 

Chapter 25.  Having delivered this message, he came to Brundisium with six legions, three of veterans,  and the rest, (those) which he had raised in the recent levy and brought up to strength on the march; for he had immediately sent Domitius' cohorts from Corfinium to Sicily. He discovered that the consuls (i.e. Lentulus and Marcellus) had gone to Dyrrachium (i.e. a harbour in Illyricum on the eastern shore of the Adriatic) and that Pompey was remaining at Brundisium with twenty cohorts; but he could not find out for certain whether he had stayed there for the sake of holding on to Brundisium, so that he might the more easily keep under his control the whole of the Adriatic sea from the extreme parts of Italy and the coastal regions of Greece, and so that he might be able to conduct the war from both sides (of the sea), or whether he had been stuck there through a lack of ships, and, fearing lest he might decide not to leave Italy, he resolved to blockade the port of Brundisium and (obstruct) its operations as a port. The plan for these works was as follows: (at the place) where the mouth of the harbour was most narrow, he threw up (great) mounds of earth on both sides of the inlet, because in these places the sea was shallow. As the work progressed, when the mole could not be continued in the deeper water, he placed two rafts, thirty feet square exactly opposite the mound. These he made fast with four anchors at their four corners, lest they were disturbed by the waves. Having completed them and put (them) in place, he then joined (them to) other rafts of equal size. These he covered over with a pile of earth, lest access (to them) and boarding (them) for the purpose of defence might be hindered; in their front and on both sides of them he covered them over with a parapet of wickerwork; on every fourth one of these he erected a turret two storeys (high), by means of which he might defend (them) against more effectively from attack by ships and being set on fire.   

Chapter 26.  Against these (measures), Pompey fitted out some large merchant vessels, which he seized in the harbour of Brundisium. On these he erected turrets three storeys high, and, having equipped them with a number of catapults and weapons of every kind, he propelled (them) at Caesar's works in order to break up the rafts and disrupt the (siege-)works. So, on both sides they went on fighting every day at a distance with slings, arrows and other weapons. However, Caesar was conducting these (operations) in a way that was compatible with his thinking that (the hope of) peace should not be dismissed; but, yet, he was greatly surprised that Magius, whom he had sent to Pompey with proposals, was not sent back to him; and, although his attempts at such a settlement often retarded his plans of attack, he still thought that he ought, by all means, to persevere in this (line of thought). He, therefore, sent his legate (Gaius) Caninius Rebilus to his close friend and relation (Lucius) Scribonius Libo for the purpose of an interview; he charged (him) to exhort Libo on the need to bring about peace; (and) he asked that he should speak with Pompey himself; he explained that he had great hopes, that, if the opportunity for such a meeting occurred, (the result) would be that they would lay down their arms on level terms; (and) that a great part of the glory, and the credit for this event would go to Libo, if through his agency and his efforts there should be an end to hostilities. When he had finished his conversation with Caninius, Libo went to Pompey. Shortly afterwards he came back with the reply that, because the consuls were absent, there could be no discussion of a settlement. So, Caesar finally decided that he should abandon his frequent and vain attempts (to reach) an understanding, and that the war should (now) be prosecuted (with vigour).  

Chapter 27.  When nearly half of the (siege)-works had been carried out by Caesar, and nine days had been spent on this activity, the ships, which had transported the first part of the army there, (were) sent back from Dyrrachium by the consuls, and returned to Brundisium. Pompey, either alarmed by Caesar's works, or because he had decided even right from the start to leave Italy, began to prepare his departure on the arrival of the ships, and, so as to check the more readily Caesar's assault, lest his soldiers should break into the town at the very (moment) of his departure, he blocked up the gates, barricaded the streets and avenues, (and) dug trenches across the roads, and fixed spikes and sharpened stakes in them. He covered these (trenches) with light hurdles and earth; furthermore, he barricaded the two access roads, which led to the harbour beyond the walls, with very large pointed beams fixed in them. After making these arrangements, he ordered his soldiers to go aboard the ships in silence, while he stationed here and there on the wall and the turrets some light-armed (men that he had picked) from his veterans, archers and slingers. These he resolved to recall by a fixed signal, when all his soldiers had embarked on the ships, and he left some swift vessels for them in an accessible spot. 

Chapter 28.  The people of Brundisium, disturbed by their ill-treatment at the hands of Pompey's troops and the insults (they had received) from Pompey himself, were in favour of Caesar's cause. When, therefore, they learned of Pompey's departure, while his men were rushing about and were preoccupied by their embarkation, they made signs publicly from the roof-tops. Having discovered through them what was happening, Caesar ordered scaling ladders to be made available and his men to be armed, lest he should lose any opportunity for action to be taken. Pompey set sail at nightfall. (Those) who had been stationed on the wall in order to guard (it) were recalled by the signal which had been agreed, and hurried down to the ships by well-known paths. (Caesar's) men fixed their ladders and climbed the walls, but, having been warned by the inhabitants of Brundisium of the hidden palisade and the trenches, they halted, and, having been conducted by them around a long detour, they reached the harbour, and caught and took possession of two (of Pompey's) ships with their soldiers which had fallen foul of Caesar's mole, (and) they took off (their passengers) by means of some skiffs and small boats.  

Chapter 29.  Though Caesar, in the hope of the issue being settled, strongly approved of collecting a fleet to cross the sea and follow Pompey before the latter could strengthen his (position) with overseas auxiliaries, yet he was afraid of the delay and the long period of time that such activity (would involve), because by gathering all (the available) ships Pompey had deprived him of the present opportunity of pursuing (him). It was left (to him) that he should await ships from the remoter regions of Gaul and Picenum, and from the straits (i.e. the Sicilian straits, or the straits of Messana). This, on account of the time of year, appeared (to be) a lengthy and troublesome (operation). In the meantime, he was unwilling that a veteran army and the two Spanish (provinces), one of which was bound to Pompey by the great benefits (he had bestowed upon it) (i.e. Hispania Citerior, or Hither Spain, where he had given Roman citizenship to a number of Spaniards in 72 B.C, after his campaign against Sertorius), should be confirmed (in their allegiance), (and) that auxiliary forces (and) cavalry should be raised (there), and Gaul and Italy attacked in his absence. 

5.  Caesar's Senate (Chapters 30-33). 

Chapter 30.  So, for the present he gave up his intention of pursuing Pompey, (and) decided to go to Spain, (and) he commanded the magistrates of all the municipal towns to collect ships and arrange for (them) to be brought to Brundisium. He dispatched his legate (Quintus) Valerius (Orca) to Sardinia with one legion, Curio as propraetor to Sicily with two legions, and he ordered the same (man), when he had recovered Sicily, to transport his army across to Africa at once. Marcus (Aurelius) Cotta was holding Sardinia, (and) Marcus Cato Sicily; (Lucius Aelius) Tubero was due to take over Africa by lot. As soon as the inhabitants of Caralis (i.e. a town in Sardinia) heard that Valerius had been sent, even though he had not yet set out from Italy, they expelled Cotta from their town. Terrified, because he thought that the whole province shared their feelings, he fled to Africa. In Sicily, Cato was repairing old ships of war, (and) requisitioning new (ones) from the city-states. He was doing these (things) with great zeal. Through his lieutenants he was holding levies of Roman citizens among the people of Lucania and Bruttium, (and) he was exacting a fixed quota of cavalrymen and infantrymen from the city-states of Sicily. When these arrangements were almost completed, he learned of Curio's approach and complained at a public meeting that he had been abandoned and betrayed by Gnaeus Pompey, who had undertaken an unnecessary war with everything unprepared, and that, when questioned by him and by others in the senate, he had assured them that everything was ready and prepared for war. Having made these complaints in his speech, he fled the province.  

Chapter 31.  Having obtained (provinces) vacated by their governors, Valerius Sardinia (and) Curio Sicily, they proceeded to them with their armies. When Tubero arrived in Africa, he found Attius Varus in power in the province; having lost his cohorts at Auximum, as I have related above, he had gone straight to Africa as a refuge, and had taken control of it in its vacant (state) on his own initiative, and by holding a levy had managed to raise two legions, having found the means to carry these (things) out through his knowledge of its people and places, and his experience of the province, because a few years earlier he had acquired that province after his praetorship. 

Chapter 32.  After making these arrangements, Caesar, in order that there might be some break from their labour for the rest of the season, distributed his troops among the nearest towns; he himself went to the city. Having summoned the senate, he reminded (them) of the injuries (done to him) by his enemies. He told (them) that he had sought no extraordinary honour, but had awaited the statutory interval between consulships (i.e. ten years) and had been content with what was allowed to every citizen; that a bill had been carried by ten tribunes of the people - although his enemies had spoken against (it), with Cato in particular opposing (it) most bitterly and effecting a delay by his usual custom of speaking for a day - that permission should be given him (to stand) in his absence, with Pompey himself as consul (i.e. in 52 B.C.). If he had disapproved of (it), why had he allowed it to be passed? If he had approved of (it), why should he debar him from enjoying the people's favour? He referred to his own forbearance, when he had voluntarily proposed that the armies should be disbanded, (a proposal) with regard to which he would have suffered a loss of prestige and honour. He spoke of the bitterness of his enemies, who demanded from another what they would reject in relation to themselves, and (who) would prefer that all (things) should be thrown into confusion rather than that they should lose their power and their armies. He proclaimed their injustice in taking away his legions, and their cruelty and insolence in restricting (the privileges of) the tribunes of the people; he recalled the terms that had been laid down by him, and the conference (which he had) sought and (which had been) refused (by them). For these reasons he exhorted and urged (them) to undertake to govern the republic together with him. If they should shrink from (the task) in fear, he would not be a burden to them, and he would govern the republic by himself. Envoys should be sent to Pompey; nor was he put off by what Pompey had said in the senate a short (time) before, that authority was acknowledged to be attributed to those to whom envoys were sent, and fear to those who sent (them). Such (views) appeared (to be the mark) of a shallow and feeble mind. But, just as he had striven to surpass (all others) in achievements, so he was eager to outdo (them) in justice and equity.  
 
Chapter 33.  The senate approved the decision to send envoys; but none could be found to be sent, as everyone declined the task of being an envoy on account of a very great fear for himself. For, as he was departing from the city, Pompey had said in the senate that he would regard (those) who had remained at Rome and (those) who had been in Caesar's camp (as though they had been) in the same place. So, three days were wasted in arguments and excuses. Also, Lucius (Caecilius) Metellus, a tribune of the people, was induced by Caesar's enemies to obstruct this business, and to hinder anything else he might try to do. After he had discovered this plot, Caesar, having spent a number of days to no purpose, left the city, in order that he might not lose any more time, and went to Further (i.e. Transalpine) Gaul, without achieving those (things) which he had intended to do. 

6.  Resistance at Massilia (Chapters 34-36)

Chapter 34.  When he arrived there, he learned that Vibullius Rufus, whom he himself had captured a few days earlier at Corfinium (and then) released, (had been) sent to Spain by Pompey; that, likewise, Domitius (had) gone to occupy Massilia (i.e. modern Marseilles) with seven swift ships, which had been requisitioned (by him) from some private (citizens) on Igilium (i.e. a small island off the coast of Etruria) and in the area around Cosa (i.e. an Etruscan town), (and then) manned by his slaves, freedmen (and) tenant farmers; (and) that also some young Massilian noblemen (had been) sent ahead to their homeland (as) messengers, and Pompey had urged them as they were leaving the city not (to let) Caesar's recent services erase the memories of his won past favours to them. When they had received these messages, the Massilians had closed their gates to Caesar; they had sent for the Albici, a barbarian people, who had been in alliance with them since ancient times and (who) lived in the mountains above Massilia, and they had conveyed corn from the neighbouring districts and from all their forts into the city, and they had established workshops for (making) weapons in the city and were starting to repair their walls, gates and fleet.     

Chapter 35.  Caesar sent for the fifteen leading citizens of Massilia. He addressed them with these (words): that, lest the beginning of war being made should be caused by the Massiliotes, they ought to follow the example of all Italy, rather than submit to the will of one man. He mentioned other (things) which he thought would tend towards their minds responding to reason. The deputies took his words back home, and, with the authorisation of their senate, reported back to Caesar as follows: that they understood that the Roman people were divided into two factions. That they possessed neither (the ability) to judge nor the strength (of mind) to determine which of the two parties had the juster cause. But that the leading men of these factions were Gnaeus Pompey and Gaius Caesar, (both) patrons of their city-state, of which the former had publicly granted them the lands of the Vocae Arecomici (i.e. a Gallic tribe based around Nemausus, or modern Nîmes) and of the Helvii (i.e. a Gallic tribe from the Cevennes), (and) the latter, after defeating the Sallyes (i.e. a Gallic tribe living on the River Durance) in war, had made (them) their tributaries and (thus) augmented their revenues. Therefore, (having received) equal favours from both of them, they ought to show them equal good-will too, and assist neither of them against the other or admit (either) into their city or its harbours. 

Chapter 36.  While these (matters) were being discussed between them, Domitius arrived at Massilia with his ships, and was admitted by them and put in charge of the city; the whole management of the war was entrusted to him. At his command, they dispatched their fleet in all directions; they seized merchant vessels, wherever they could (find them), and escorted (them) into their harbour, (where) they utilised the bolts, and timber, and rigging, (which they took) from (those that were) inadequately fitted out, to rig out the other (ships); what corn was found (in them) they stored in the public (granary); the rest of their merchandise and provisions they kept back for a siege, in case one should happen. Provoked by these illegal acts, Caesar led three legions to Massilia, and resolved to bring up turrets and penthouses for the purpose of assaulting the city, and to build warships, twelve in number, at Arelate (i.e. the modern Arles). These having been completed and fitted out within thirty days from the time when the timber was cut down, and having been brought to Massilia, he put Decimus (Junius) Brutus in command of them, (and) left his legate Gaius Trebonius to attack the city. 

7.  The first Spanish campaign - Ilerda (Chapters 37-55).

Chapter 37.  While he was preparing and organising these (arrangements), he sent his legate Gaius Fabius ahead (of him) into Spain with three legions, which he had stationed in Narbo (i.e. modern Narbonne) and those places roundabout for the purpose of passing the winter, and ordered that the passes of the Pyrenees, which at that time were being held by detachments of (Pompey's) legate Lucius Afranius, should be speedily occupied. He ordered the remaining legions, which were spending the winter further away, to follow. As he had been ordered, Fabius applied speed in dislodging the garrison from the pass, and by forced marches came up with Afranius' army.  

Chapter 38.  On the arrival of Lucius Vibullius Rufus, whom it has been mentioned (had been) sent into Spain by Pompey, Pompey's legates Afranius, (Marcus) Petreius, and (Marcus Terentius) Varro, the first of whom held Hither Spain with three legions, the second Further (Spain) from the pass of Castulo to the (River) Anas (i.e. the modern Guadiana), (and) the third (Further Spain) from the (River) Anas to the territory of the Vettones and Lusitania with a like number of legions, reallocated their spheres of duty  among themselves, so that Petreius was to proceed with all his forces from Lusitania through the Vettones to (join) Afranius, (while) Varro was to keep watch over the whole of Further Spain with those legions that he had. These deployments having been decided, cavalry and auxiliary troops were demanded from the whole of Lusitania by Petreius, (and) from Celtiberia (i.e. a mountainous region of Hither Spain inhabited by savage tribes), the Cantabrians,  (i.e. a tribe inhabiting Northern Spain), and all the barbarous (tribes) whose (territories) stretch to the Ocean by Afranius. When these (forces) had been gathered together, Petreius came quickly through the Vettones to (join) Afranius, and they resolved by a shared plan to wage war in the region of Ilerda (i.e. modern Lérida. This circumstance , a town in north-east Spain) on account of the advantages (offered) by that very site.     

Chapter 39.  There were, as mentioned above, three legions belonging to Afranius, (and) two to Petreius, besides around eighty cohorts of long-shielded men (i.e. men carrying the 'scutum') from the Hither Province and of men carrying a small round Spanish shield (i.e. the 'caetra' or targe) from Further Spain, and about five thousand cavalrymen drawn from both provinces. Caesar had sent ahead (of him) into Spain six legions, five thousand auxiliary infantrymen, three thousand cavalrymen, which he had (with him) in all his previous campaigns, and a similar number from Gaul, which he himself had pacified, having summoned individually the noblest of men, and the bravest too, from all the states; to these he had added (some of) the best kind of men from the Aquitanians  and from the mountains which border on the Gallic province. He had heard that Pompey was making his way to Spain with his legions through Mauretania (i.e. North-west Africa), and would shortly be arriving. At the same time, he took borrowed money from his military tribunes and centurions; this he distributed to his army. By doing this, he achieved two things, in that he bound the hearts of his centurions (to him) by his pledge (to repay them), and he won the good-will of his soldiers by his bounty. 

Chapter 40.  Fabius tried to influence the inclinations of the states by letters and by messengers. He built two bridges over the River Sicoris (i.e. the modern River Segre, a tributary of the Ebro) with a distance of four miles between them. He sent (men) across these bridges to forage, because he had (already) consumed during the preceding days what (forage) had existed on his side of the river. The generals of the Pompeian army did almost the same thing, and for the same reason, and they engaged in frequent cavalry battles between each other. When two of Fabius' legions, having gone out of their (camp) as a guard for the foragers in accordance with their daily custom, had crossed the river by the nearer bridge, and the baggage-train and all the cavalry were following, the bridge collapsed due to a sudden blast of wind and a mass of water, and the main body of the cavalry was left stranded. What (had happened) was perceived by Petreius and Afranius from the lumps of earth and the pieces of wood that were being carried downstream, and Afranius quickly led four legions and all his cavalry across his own bridge, which he built to connect the town and his camp, and he encountered Fabius' two legions. When the news of his approach was reported, Lucius (Munatius) Plancus, who was in command of those legions, compelled by the necessity of the situation, took up his position on higher (ground), and arranged his battle-line into two sections, facing in opposite directions, so that he could not be surrounded by their cavalry. So, though encountering an unequal number, he withstood the strong attacks of legions and cavalry. When battle had been joined by the cavalry, the standards were seen in the distance by both (sides) of the two legions which Gaius Fabius had sent by the further bridge to reinforce our (men), suspecting that what did happen would (happen), (that is) that the generals of our adversaries, would take advantage of the opportunity (provided by this stroke) of good fortune to attack our (men). The arrival of these (forces) put an end to the battle, and both (sides) led their legions back to camp. 

Chapter 41.  Two days after that Caesar arrived at the camp with nine hundred cavalry, which he had kept as his bodyguard. The bridge, which had been broken up by the storm, had almost been repaired; he ordered that it should be finished that night. He himself, being aware of the nature of the countryside, left behind six cohorts to guard the bridge and the camp and all his baggage, and the next day he set off for Ilerda with all his forces drawn up in three lines, and halted close to Afranius' camp, and, pausing there under arms for a short time, he created the opportunity to fight on level ground. The opportunity having been given (him), Afranius led out his forces, and positioned (them) in the middle of a hill close to his camp. When Caesar realised that it was due to Afranius that he was not engaged in battle, he decided to make camp at a distance of about four hundred yards from the very foot of the hill, and, in order that his soldiers should not be alarmed by a sudden enemy incursion and be prevented from working, he said that that (the camp) should not be fortified by a rampart, which was bound to be prominent and to be visible from a distance, but he did order a trench to be dug, fifteen feet in width, facing the enemy. Now the first and second lines remained under arms, as they had been constituted from the beginning; behind them the work was carried out in secret by the third line. As a result, the whole of the work was completed before it was discovered by Afranius that the camp was being fortified. In the evening Caesar led his legions back inside the trench, and there under arms they reposed during the following night. 

Chapter 42.  The next day he kept the whole army inside the trench, and, because materials had to be brought from a considerable distance, he followed, for the present, the same plan of operation, and assigned to each one of the legions one side of the camp for the purpose of fortification, and ordered trenches to be dug of the same size (as the first one); he kept the remaining legions under arms (but) without baggage to ward off the enemy. Afranius and Petreius, in order to frighten (us) and obstruct our work, brought up their forces to the very foot of the mountain, and challenged (us) to a battle. But Caesar did not interrupt the work for this reason, relying on the protection afforded by the three legions and the fortification of the trench. After staying (there) for a short time, and, advancing no further from the bottom of the hill, they led their forces back to their camp. On the third day, Caesar fortified his camp with a rampart, (and) ordered the other cohorts, which he had left in the previous camp, and the baggage to be brought up to them. 

Chapter 43.  Between the town of Ilerda and the nearby hill, where Petreius and Afranius had their camp, there was a plain about three hundred yards (in width), and almost in the middle of this space there was a small eminence raised up a little (from the ground). Caesar was sure that, if he could occupy this and fortify (it), he would cut the enemy off from the town, and the bridge, and all the provisions which they had brought with (them) into the town. With this expectation, he led three legions out of the camp, and, drawing up his battle-line in a suitable position, he ordered the advance-guards of one legion to rush forward and seize the hillock. When this plan was understood, Afranius' cohorts that were in post in front of his camp were hastily sent by a shorter route to occupy the same spot. They engaged in battle, but, because Afranius' men had arrived at the hillock first, our (men) were driven back, and, as other (enemy) reinforcements were dispatched, they were forced to retreat and go back to their legionary standards. 

Chapter 44.  It was the method of fighting (employed) by those (enemy) soldiers to charge forward with great force at the outset (and) boldly take a position, not (to) keep their ranks very strictly, (and to) fight in open order (and) spread out (in small groups); if they were hard pressed, they did not think (it was) disgraceful to give up their position, as they were accustomed to this barbarous manner of fighting with the Lusitanians and other barbarian (tribes); for it generally happens that every soldier becomes used to the customs of those regions in the places where they have spent much (time). This practice, however, upset our (men), unaccustomed (as they were) to this kind of fighting; for, (when they saw) individuals running forward on their exposed flanks, they thought they were being surrounded; yet, they, themselves, thought it was their duty to preserve their ranks, and not to desert their standards, nor, without a serious reason, to be detached from the position which they had taken up. And so, when the advance-guard was thrown into confusion, the legion which had been stationed on that wing did not hold its ground but retreated to the next hill. 

Chapter 45.   With almost his whole army being alarmed (by this), because it had occurred contrary to their expectation and custom, Caesar urged his legions on, and led the Ninth Legion in their support; he checked the enemy in their insolent and eager pursuit of our (men), and compelled (them) in their turn to retreat and withdraw to the town of Ilerda, and to halt under its walls. But the soldiers of the Ninth Legion, being full of enthusiasm, while they wished to repair the setback they had received, and, having rashly pursued the fleeing (enemy) too far, advanced into an unfavourable position and came to the foot of the mountain on which the town of Ilerda had been built. When they tried to withdraw from that position, the enemy attacked our (men) again from higher ground. The ground was steep and sheer on each side and was only wide enough so that three cohorts, drawn up (in line of battle) could fill the space, but no reinforcements could be sent up on the flanks, nor could cavalry be of any help (to them) if they got into distress. From the town, however, the sloping ground inclined gently downwards for a distance of about four hundred yards. It was necessary for our (men) to retreat this (way), because, aroused by their eagerness, they had advanced somewhat incautiously; the battle was fought on this ground, unfavourable (as it was) both on account of its narrowness and because they had taken up their position at the very foot of the mountain, so that no missile could be hurled at them to no effect. Yet, they exerted themselves with courage and endurance, and sustained every (kind of) wound. The (enemy's) forces were being augmented, and cohorts were being repeatedly sent up from their camp through the town, so that fresh (men) might relieve the weary. Caesar was forced to do the same (thing), so that, by sending up (fresh) cohorts to the same spot, he might rescue his exhausted (men). 

Chapter 46.  When there had been continual fighting in this manner for five hours, and our (men) had been very hard pressed by a greater number (of men) (and) all their javelins had been used up, they drew their swords and made a charge up the hill against their cohorts, and, having killed a few (men), they compelled the rest to turn back. When their cohorts had been pushed back to the wall, and a number (of their men) had been driven into the town on account of their fear, an easy retreat was granted to our (men). Moreover, our cavalry, although on both flanks it had taken up its position on low-lying and unfavourable ground, yet it struggled with great courage to the top (of the hill), and, riding up and down between both battle-lines, it afforded our (men) an easier and safer retreat. So the fighting took place with differing results. In the first encounter about seventy of our (men) fell, (and) among them (was) Quintus Fulginius, (centurion) of the senior (company) of 'hastati' (i.e. the second line) of the Fourteenth Legion, who had been promoted to to that position from the lower ranks on account of his exceptional bravery; more than six hundred were wounded. Of Afranius' men, Titus Caecilius, a principal centurion, and four centurions in addition to him, and over two hundred men, were killed.  

Chapter 47.  But the belief spread about on that day that both sides thought they had come away better off: Afranius' men, because, although they were considered to be inferior by everyone, they had stood their ground at close quarters and had resisted the attack of our (men), and they had initially held their post on the hill, which had been the cause of the fighting, and, in the first encounter, had forced our (men) to retreat; but our (men) because, even though they were fighting on unfavourable ground and with an unequal number (of men), they had sustained the battle for five hours, (and) because they had ascended the hill with drawn swords, and forced their adversaries to flee from the higher ground and had driven (them) into the town. The (enemy) fortified the hill, on behalf of which the fighting had occurred, with substantial (defence) works, and placed a garrison there. 

Chapter 48.  Also, two days after these (actions) had been carried out, there occurred an unexpected misfortune. For so great a storm arose, that it was agreed that there had never been any greater rainfall in those territories. At that time, then, it washed down the snow from every mountain, and rose above the top of the river-banks, and broke up in one day both the bridges which Gaius Fabius had built. For, since our camp, as mentioned above (n.b. this is an error, as it has not been referred to previously), was (pitched) between two rivers, the Sicoris and the Cinga (i.e. the modern River Cinca), thirty miles apart, and neither of these could be crossed, they were, of necessity, confined within these (limits). Neither could the states, which had gone to Caesar in friendship, supply (him with) corn, nor (could) those (men) return, who had gone some distance away in search of forage, cut off (as they were) by the rivers, nor (could) the large (stocks of) provisions, which had come to them from Italy and Gaul, get through to their camp. Besides, it was the most awkward time (of the year), when there were no (stocks of) corn in the winter stores, and (this year's crop) was not very far from ripeness, and the states' (supplies were) exhausted because Afranius had carried off almost all their corn before Caesar's arrival, (and) Caesar had consumed in the previous days whatever had been left over; the cattle, which could have been an alternative source (of food) in case of want, the neighbouring states had removed some distance away. Lusitanian light-armed (infantry) and targeteers (i.e. those bearing a targe or a 'caetra') from Hither Spain, who knew those districts well, harried those who had gone out for the sake of obtaining fodder or corn; for them it was a straightforward (matter) to cross a river, because it was the custom of all of them not to go on campaign without bladders (i.e. inflatable skins).

Chapter 49.  But Afranius' army had an abundant supply of everything. A large (stock of) corn had been provided and gathered together in earlier times, (and) much (of it) was brought in from all over the province; (and) a great abundance of fodder was in store. The bridge at Ilerda afforded access to all these things without any danger, and the places across the river, to which Caesar could not go at all, (were) untouched. 

Chapter 50.  The floods lasted for several days. Caesar attempted to repair the bridges, but the height of the river did not permit (it), nor did the enemy cohorts stationed on the bank allow (the work) to be completed. It was easy for them to prevent (it), not only on account of the nature of the river itself and the height of the water, but also because their missiles were thrown from all along the bank on to one confined spot; and it was difficult to carry out the works in a very fast flowing river and, at the same time, to avoid the missiles.   

Chapter 51.  The news was brought to Afranius that the great supply convoys, which were on their way to Caesar, had halted at the river. Archers from the Rutheni (i.e. a Gallic tribe) had arrived there, (as well as) cavalry from Gaul, together with many wagons and a large (train of) baggage, as Gallic custom requires. In addition, there were around six thousand men of all kinds, together with slaves and freedmen; but there was no organisation, no fixed authority, as everyone followed his own inclination, and they all made the journey without any apprehension, enjoying the (same) freedom (as they had experienced) on marches on previous occasions. There were (also) several young men of good family, sons of senators and of equestrian rank; there were ambassadors from the states, and (some) of Caesar's lieutenants. All these the rivers held back. Hoping to overpower them, Afranius set out at night with all his cavalry and three legions, and, the cavalry having been sent out ahead, he took (them) unawares. But the Gallic horsemen quickly sorted themselves out, and joined battle. (Though) few, they withstood the vast number of the enemy, while the action could be fought on equal terms; but when the standards of the legions began to approach, they took themselves off to the nearest mountains, with a few (men) lost. The time (spent) on this battle was of great importance to the safety of (the rest of) our (men). For, some time having been gained, they withdrew to higher ground. On that day, about two hundred bow-men, a few cavalrymen, and a small number of servants and (pieces of) baggage were lost. 

Chapter 52.  Due to all of these (circumstances), corn increased (in price). Such an increase usually happens not only due to a present shortage, but also due to fear that the position will become worse at some time in the future. (The price of) corn had already reached fifty denarii for each bushel, and the shortage of corn had diminished the soldiers' strength, and the difficulties were increasing on a daily basis; and, in a few days. so great a change in their circumstances had occurred and fortune had (so) turned itself around, that our (men) were (now) struggling with a great shortage of all necessary commodities, (while) the (enemy) had an abundance of all supplies, and were considered to be in a stronger position. Caesar demanded cattle from those states that had joined his alliance, because their supply of corn was so low; he packed off the camp followers to more distant states; he, himself, sought to address the current shortage with whatever assistance he could (find).  

Chapter 53.  Afranius and Petreius and their friends sent even fuller and more fruitful accounts of these (events) to their (adherents) at Rome. These reports exaggerated (the circumstances) considerably, so that the war seemed almost at an end. When these letters and messengers arrived at Rome, great crowds gathered at Afranius' house and (there were) lavish congratulations; many (men) set out from Rome to (join) Gnaeus Pompey, some lest they might seem to have waited for the outcome of the war, and (others lest they might seem) to have arrived last of all. 

Chapter 54.  When his affairs were in this difficult (situation) and all roads were blocked by Afranius' soldiers and cavalrymen, and the bridge could not be repaired, Caesar ordered his men to build boats of the kind which his experience of Britain in earlier years had taught him. The keels and the basic ribs were made of light timber; (then) the rest of the boats' hulk was bound with wickerwork and covered with hides of leather. When they were finished, he conveyed them at night on linked wagons twenty-two miles from the camp, and transported his men across the river in these boats, and unexpectedly took possession of a hill adjoining the bank. He quickly fortified (it), before this was perceived by his adversaries. To this place he later transferred a legion, and, having started (to build) a bridge from both sides, he completed (it) in two days. By this means he safely rescued the supply convoys and (those) who had gone out in search of corn, and he began to improve the position with regard to the distribution of corn.    

Chapter 55.  On the same day he sent a large part of his cavalry across the river. Falling unexpectedly on a part of foragers, who had been dispersed without any fear (of attack), they intercepted a considerable number of cattle and men, and, when some cohorts of targeteers had been sent to their assistance, they cleverly divided themselves into two groups, one to guard the spoil, (and) the other to stop the advancing (foe) and beat them back, and they cut off and surrounded and slaughtered one cohort, which had rashly charged forward out of line (and) ahead of the others, and (then) they returned unharmed to the camp by the same bridge with a large (quantity of) booty. 
 
8.  A naval fight at Massilia (Chapters 56-58). 

Chapter 56.  While these (events) were taking place at Ilerda, the Massiliotes, following the instructions of Lucius Domitius, prepared the number of seventeen warships for action, eleven of which were decked. To these they added several smaller vessels, (hoping) that our fleet might be intimidated by such a large number. On (them) they put a great number of archers and of the Albici, who have been referred to previously, and these they bribed by the promise of rewards. Domitius required a certain (number of) ships for his own (use), and these he manned with farmers and shepherds, whom he had brought along with him. When his fleet had been thus equipped with all necessities, they bore down with great confidence on our ships, which Decimus Brutus was commanding. These had their anchorage off an island which is opposite Massilia.  

Chapter 57.  Brutus' (position) was much inferior in terms of the number of his ships. But Caesar had assigned to that fleet the bravest men (who had been) chosen from all his legions, advance-guards and centurions, (men) who had demanded (that they should perform) this (type of) service on his behalf. They had prepared iron hooks and grappling-irons, and had equipped themselves with a vast number of javelins, darts and other missiles. So, having learned of the enemy's approach, they sailed their ships out of harbour, (and) engaged with the Massiliotes. Both sides fought with the greatest bravery and eagerness; nor did the Albici, a hardy people from the highlands and (well) versed in arms, fall far short of our (men) in courage; and they, having just come from the Massiliotes, retained their recent promises in their minds, and Domitius' shepherds, spurred on by the hope of freedom, were keen to demonstrate their exertions before the eyes of their master.  

Chapter 58.  The Massiliotes, themselves, relying on the speed of their ships and the skill of their helmsmen, continually eluded our (ships), and evaded their attacks, and, as long as they were permitted to take advantage of a wider space, they strove to surround us by extending their line further, or to attack single (ships of ours) with several ships (of their own), or to sail close by (them) and snap off their oars, if they could. When they were forced to come closer, (they moved away) from the knowledge and skill of their pilots and had recourse to the courage of the men from the mountains. Our (men) were both making use of less practised oarsmen and less skilful pilots, who had (just) been hastily recruited from merchant vessels, and were as yet still unacquainted even with the technical names of the ships' gear, and they were also hampered by the tardiness and weight of our vessels; for, having been hastily constructed out of green timber, they did not have the same capacity for speed. So, when the opportunity was offered to fight at close quarters, they readily put up one (of their own) against two (of the enemy's) ships, and, by using grappling-irons and holding both ships fast, they fought on both sides of the deck and boarded the enemy's vessels, and, having killed a great number of Albici and shepherds, they sank some of the ships, captured a number of the others together with their crews, and forced the rest into the harbour. On that day, nine of the Massiliotes' ships were lost, including those which were taken. 

9.  Spain - a war of attrition (Chapters 59-80). 

Chapter 59.  The (news of) this (battle) was reported to Caesar at Ilerda at the same time as the bridge was completed, and a swift change of fortune occurred. Alarmed by the courage of our cavalry, the (enemy) moved around less freely (and) less boldly (than before); sometimes they would venture out (only) a short distance from the camp, so they could make a swift retreat, and they would forage over narrower areas; at other times they avoided our guard-posts and parties of horsemen (by taking) a longer route, or having sustained some loss or having seen our cavalry in the distance, they would flee in the midst of their journey, (while) discarding their packs. Finally, they resolved to cease foraging for several days, and, contrary to the usual practice of everyone, (to do so only) at night. 

Chapter 60.  In the meantime, the Oscenses and the Calagurritani, who were incorporated with the Oscenses, sent envoys to him (i.e. Caesar) and promised that they would obey his instructions. The Tarraconenses, and the Jacetani, and the Ausetani, and, a few days later, the Illurgavonenses, who live by the River Ebro, followed them. He required all of them to help him by (supplying) corn. (This) they promised (to do), and, having collected all the pack animals from all parts (of their territories), they convey (it) (i.e. corn) into the camp. A cohort of the Illurgavonenses also went over to him, on learning of their state's decision, and transferred its standards from the place where they were stationed. A great change in the situation (had) rapidly (occurred). Now that the bridge had been finished, five important states had joined themselves in alliance (with Caesar), (and,) with the problem of the corn (supply) having been settled, and, with the rumours of the legionary reinforcements, which were said to be coming with Pompey through Mauretania, having been extinguished, many of the more distant states defected from Afranius and pursued an alliance with Caesar. 

Chapter 61.  While the minds of his adversaries were thoroughly alarmed by these developments, Caesar, in order that he might not always have to send his cavalry on a long detour by the bridge, once he had found a suitable place, began to dig several ditches thirty feet in width, by which he might divert some of the waters of the Sicoris and make a ford over the river. When these works had almost been completed, Afranius and Petreius developed a great fear, that they might be cut off altogether from (their supplies) of corn and fodder, because Caesar was so strong in cavalry. So, they themselves decided to leave the district and to transfer the war to Celtiberia. The following circumstance also confirmed (them) in this decision, (namely) that, of the two opposing parties, the states that had sided with Sertorius in the late war, and had been conquered, (still) trembled at the name and power of Pompey, (even) in his absence, (and those) that had remained in alliance (with him), and had received great favours (from him), continued to be devoted to him, but the name of Caesar was quite unknown among the barbarians. From them they were expecting great (numbers) of cavalry and great (numbers) of auxiliary troops, and they planned to extend the war into the winter on ground of their own (choosing). Once they had decided on this course of action, they ordered boats to be collected from all along the River Ebro and that they be brought to Octogesa (i.e. the modern Mequinenza). This town was situated on the Ebro, and was thirty miles away from the camp. At this place on the river, they ordered a bridge to be made by joining boats together, and they led two legions across the River Sicoris and fortified their camp with a rampart twelve feet (high). 

Chapter 62.  Having learned of these events from his scouts, Caesar continued, through the great labour of his soldiers, the work of draining the river (all) day and night, and had so far reduced the level (of the water), that the cavalry, although it was done with difficulty and discomfort, were able and bold enough to cross the river, but the infantry, had only their shoulders and the upper (part of) their breasts above the water-line, and were prevented from crossing (the river) not only by the height of the water, but also by the speed of the current. But, yet, at almost the same time, the bridge over the Ebro was reported (to be) nearly completed, and a ford was found in the Sicoris.  

Chapter 63.  But now they (i.e. Afranius and Petreius) thought (it was) all the more necessary to hasten their march. And so, having left two cohorts of auxiliaries to guard Ilerda, they crossed the Sicoris with their whole force, and they set up camp together with the two legions which they had sent across on the previous days. No (course) was left (open) to Caesar other than to harass and wear down his enemy's column with his cavalry. For (the use of) his own bridge involved a long detour, while the (enemy) could reach the Ebro by a much shorter route. Detached by him, the cavalry crossed the river, and, when Petreius and Afranius struck camp around the third watch (i.e. after midnight), they suddenly appeared at the rear of the column, and, surrounding them in great numbers, they began to retard and impede their march. 

Chapter 64.  At dawn, it was perceived from the higher ground, which was adjoined to Caesar's camp, that their rearguard was being vigorously pressed by the attacks of our cavalry, and that the end of their column was sometimes being held up and disrupted, (but) that at other times our (men) were being attacked and driven back by a charge of all their cohorts together, and then, in turn, pursued when they had turned around. But, throughout the camp the soldiers were gathering in groups and lamenting that the enemy were slipping from their hands, (and) that the war was being drawn out over a longer period of time than was necessary, and they went to their centurions and military tribunes and begged that Caesar should be told by them not to spare them from toil or danger; (for) they were ready and able, and would venture to cross the river (at the place) where the cavalry had been transported. Encouraged by their zeal and clamour, Caesar, although he was afraid to expose his army to the magnitude of so great a river, yet he judged that he should try to attempt (a crossing). Accordingly, he ordered the weaker soldiers, whose courage or strength seemed to be unable to withstand (it), to be selected from each of the centuries. These he left behind with one legion to guard the camp; the rest of the legions he marched out, lightly armed, and, having stationed a large number of pack animals in the river, above and below (the crossing place), he led his army across. A few of these men, having been carried away by (the force of) the current, were stopped by the horses and lifted up; indeed no one perished. Once the army had safely crossed, he drew up his forces and led (them) in triple line. And so great was the enthusiasm among the troops that, although the detour to the ford had added six miles to the journey, and a considerable delay had occurred (in the crossing) of the river, before the ninth hour of the day (i.e. about three o'clock in the afternoon) they overtook those who had departed at the third watch (i.e in the small hours of the night).  

Chapter 65.  When Afranius, together with Petreius caught sight of them, seen in the distance, being alarmed by this fresh development, he halted (their men) and formed a battle-line. Caesar rested his army on the plain, so they should not be exposed to battle in a state of exhaustion; but when they tried to move on again he pursued (them) and stopped (them). The (enemy) were forced to pitch camp earlier than they had intended. For they were close to the mountains, and difficult and narrow roads awaited (them) five miles further on. They were keen to get into the mountains, in order to escape Caesar's cavalry, and, by stationing guards in the narrow (passes), to block his army on its route, (so that) they might lead their  forces across the Ebro without any danger or anxiety. It was essential for them to attempt this and to bring it about by all (possible) means; but, wearied by a whole day's fighting and by the toil of their march, they put it off to the following day. Caesar, too, pitched his camp on a nearby hill. 

Chapter 66.  Around midnight, when some of their men, who had gone too far from the camp for the sake of fetching water, were captured by our cavalry, Caesar was informed by them that his opponents' generals had led their forces out of their camp in silence. When he learned this, he ordered the signal to be given, and (the instructions for packing up) the baggage to be sounded, in accordance with military custom. Hearing the noise, the (enemy), fearing that they might be forced to fight at night, (while) encumbered with their packs, or that they might be penned into the narrow (passes) by Caesar's cavalry, put a stop to their march and contained their forces in their camp. The next day, Petreius went out  secretly with a few cavalrymen to explore the country. The same thing was done in Caesar's camp. Lucius Decidius Saxa was sent with a few (men) to examine the layout of the land. Both (parties) reported back similarly to their (armies): that the route was over level ground for the next five miles, (and) then a rough and mountainous country came after (it); (and) that whoever should obtain possession of the narrow (pass) first should have no trouble in keeping his enemy away from it.     

Chapter 67.  There was a discussion in the council meeting between Petreius and Afranius, and the timing of their march was its subject. The majority were of the opinion that they should make the journey at night; they could (then) reach the pass before this was perceived (by Caesar). Others adduced as proof that their ground could not be left in secret, because of the alarm which had been given in Caesar' camp on the previous night. (They said) that Caesar's cavalry were circling around at night and were blocking every place and road, and that it was necessary to avoid nocturnal engagements, because in a civil war a frightened soldier was more likely to take account of his fear than of his oath of loyalty. But at dawn a strong (sense of) shame by itself in the eyes of all, (and) the presence of military tribunes and centurions, the factors by which the soldiers were usually kept in line and maintained in their loyalty, were also brought to bear. Therefore, they should, by all means, try to force their way through during the day; even if they should suffer some losses, yet the bulk of their army (would be) safe, (and) they should be able to take the place they were making for. This view prevailed in the council meeting, and they decided to set off at dawn on the following day.   

Chapter 68.  Having reconnoitred the district, Caesar led his forces out of the camp as soon as the sky grew light, and he took his army on a long detour by no fixed route. For the roads, which led to the Ebro and Octogesa (i.e. the modern Mequinenza), were overlooked by the enemy's opposing camp. He was obliged to cross deep and awkward gullies, (and) in many places craggy cliffs hindered their march, so that their weapons had to be passed from hand to hand, and the soldiers completed a large part of the journey unarmed and supporting one another. But none of them objected to this labour because they thought that there would be an end to all their toils, if they could exclude the enemy from the Ebro and cut off their corn supply. 

Chapter 69.  At first, Afranius' men ran joyfully out of their camp to watch, and pursued our (men) with taunting voices: (they said) that through lack of necessary provisions, we were being forced to flee and return to Ilerda. For our route was different from our destination, and we appeared to be going in the opposite direction. But their generals applauded their own plan to keep themselves in their camp; they were strongly supported in their opinion, because they saw (our men) setting off on their march, as they were sure that we could not endure this lack (of provisions) for very long. But, when they saw our column gradually wheel to the right, and observed that our vanguard was already passing the boundary line of their camp, there was no one (among them) so sluggish or so averse to fatigue that he did not know it was necessary to leave their camp at once and come to meet (us). The call to arms was raised, and, leaving  a few cohorts behind as a guard, all their forces set out and marched to the Ebro by the direct route.   

Chapter 70.  The whole contest was dependent on speed, (that is) which one of them would occupy the defile and the mountains first. But, (while) the difficulties of the route impeded Caesar's army, Caesar's cavalry pursuing (them) delayed Afranius' forces. But the situation, from (the point of view of) Afranius' men was necessarily reduced to this, that, if they managed to reach the mountains which they were seeking first, they would avoid danger themselves, (but) they could not (then) save the baggage of their whole army, or the cohorts which they had left behind in their camp; to these, when they were intercepted by Caesar's army, help could not by any means be conveyed. Caesar completed the march first, and, having found some level ground between the large rocks, he formed a line of battle there facing the enemy. Afranius, since he saw that the rear of his column was being harassed by our cavalry, and that the enemy (was) before him, when he came upon a certain hill, he halted there. From that place he sent four cohorts of targeteers to the mountain which was the highest (one) of all (those) in sight. He ordered (them) to hurry (there) at the double and seize it, with the intention that he himself might march to the same place with all his forces, and (then) change his route and come to Octogesa over the (mountain) ridges. Since the targeteers were making for it by a side route, Caesar's cavalry caught sight of (them) and made an attack on their cohorts; nor were the targeteers able to withstand, even for a very small amount of time, the assault of our cavalry, but they were surrounded by them and slaughtered in the sight of both armies. 

Chapter 71.  There was (now) an opportunity to manage the campaign successfully, Nor, indeed, did it escape Caesar's (attention) that an army, badly shaken at the sight of such great losses having been sustained, would not be able to hold out, especially since it was surrounded on all sides by our cavalry, and any engagement would take place on level and open ground;  and this (engagement) was being urged upon him by all sections (of his army). The officers, centurions, and military tribunes flocked around (him), (telling him) not to hesitate in joining battle. (They said) that the minds of the men were totally prepared (for this). On the other hand, (they pointed out) that Afranius' men had shown signs of their fear in a number of ways: that they had not come to the assistance of their (comrades), that they had not come down from the hill, that they could scarcely withstand our cavalry charges, and that, having gathered their standards, they were crowded together in one place, neither keeping their ranks nor (guarding) their standards. But, if he should fear the disadvantage of the ground, yet (the opportunity) would be given (him) of fighting with Afranius in some other place, for he could not remain (there) without water.  

Chapter 72.  Caesar had come to hope that he could end the affair without a battle and without any wounds to his men, because he had cut off his enemies' corn supply. Why should he lose any of his men, even in a successful battle? Why should he expose his men to be wounded, when they deserved so well of him? - especially since it was no less the (function) of a general to conquer by stratagem as by the sword. Also he was moved with compassion for those citizens whom he saw must be slain; (and) he preferred to gain his object with these (men) safe and unharmed. This plan of Caesar's was not approved of by the majority (of his men); indeed they openly said to one another that, since such an opportunity of victory was being squandered, they would not be prepared to fight, even if Caesar wished (them to). (However,) he persevered in his resolution, and withdrew a short distance from that site, in order to reduce his adversaries' anxiety. Petreius and Afranius, the opportunity having been presented (to them), retired to their camp. Caesar, having posted guards in the mountains, and all access to the Ebro having been cut off, built his camp as close as he could to the enemy camp. 

Chapter 73.     On the following day, the generals of his opponents, being alarmed that they had lost the prospect of (securing) a corn-supply and of (access) to the River Ebro, deliberated concerning the other courses of action (open to them). There was one route (they could take), if they were prepared to return to Ilerda, (and) another, if they should make for Tarraco. While they were considering these (possibilities), the news was brought (to them) that their watering parties were being harried by our cavalry. When they learned of this situation, they posted several detachments of cavalry and auxiliary cohorts (on the roads) and stationed (them) between legionary cohorts, and they began to construct a rampart from their camp to the water, so that they could collect their water within the fortifications, and without fear and without guards. Petreius and Afranius divided this task between each other, and went in person some distance (from the camp) in order to ensure the completion of the work. 

Chapter 74.  Having obtained, by their departure (i.e. that of Afranius and Petreius), an unrestricted opportunity to fraternise (with our men), their soldiers came out in large numbers, and each one looked for whichever acquaintance or fellow-townsman he had in our camp, and called (him) over. Firstly, they all gave their thanks to all (of our men), because they had spared them on the previous day, when they were (so) terrified; (and they said) that they were alive through their kindness. Then, they asked about the trustworthiness of our general, and whether they could safely entrust themselves (to him), and they lamented that they had not done (so) from the beginning, and that they had engaged in battle with their close connections and kinsmen. Encouraged by these conversations, they sought a guarantee from our general concerning the lives of Petreius and Afranius, lest they might appear to have committed some crime against them or to have betrayed their (generals). When such assurances were given, they promised to transfer their standards, and they sent centurions of the front rank (as) envoys to Caesar (to talk) about peace. Meanwhile, some (of them) brought their (acquaintances) into their camp to entertain (them), (while) others are led away by their (friends), so that one camp now seemed to to have been formed from the two (of them); and several military tribunes and centurions came to Caesar and commended themselves to him (i.e. they offered him their services). The same thing was done by the Spanish chieftains, whom the (enemy generals) had summoned, and (who) were being kept with them in the camp in the position of hostages. They sought their acquaintances and guest-friends, through whom each one might have access to Caesar for the purpose of commendation. Even Afranius' youthful son tried to negotiate with Caesar through his legate (Publius) Sulpicius (Rufus) concerning his own and his father's life. All (places) were full of joy and thanksgiving, both (that) of those who had avoided such great perils (i.e. the Pompeian army) and (that) of those who seemed to have accomplished so great an achievement without bloodshed (i.e. Caesar's army), and, in the judgment of all, Caesar was reaping the great reward of his earlier leniency, and his decision was approved of by everyone.     

Chapter 75.  When these events were reported to him, Afranius quitted the task he was engaged upon, and returned to the camp, prepared, so it seemed, that, whatever misfortune should befall, he would bear it with a calmly and with a good grace. But Petreius did not abandon his (resolve). He armed his domestic retinue; with them, and his bodyguard of targeteers, and a few barbarian horsemen, dependants of his, whom he kept (near him) for the sake of his own protection, he unexpectedly rushed to the rampart, interrupted the soldiers' conversations, (and) drove our (men) from the camp and put to death (those) whom he captured. The rest came together, and, alarmed by the sudden danger, they wrapped their left-arms in their cloaks and drew their swords, and in this way defended themselves against the targeteers and the horsemen, relying on the proximity of their camp, and (then) they withdrew to the camp, and (there) they were protected by those cohorts which were on guard at the gates. 

Chapter 76.  Having done these things, Petreius went around the maniples and called the soldiers by name, and he begged (them) not to hand himself or their absent commander Pompey over to their adversaries to be punished. A crowd quickly formed at his headquarters. He demanded that they should all swear that they would not desert or betray their army and their generals, nor adopt any plan separately from the others. He, himself, was the first to swear to these words; (and) he compelled Afranius to swear the same oath; the military tribunes and the centurions followed suit; the soldiers, turned out in centuries, swore the same. Anyone, in whose quarters there was (one of) Caesar's soldiers, they ordered (him) to produce (him): (those) that were produced, they put to death publicly in the general's tent. But the majority (of those) whom they had entertained, they concealed and led out at night over the rampart. So, the fear engendered by the generals, the cruelty of their punishment, (and) the fresh sanctity of an oath removed any hope of surrender for the present, and changed the minds of the soldiers and returned the situation to the former state of war.       

Chapter 77.  Caesar ordered that the soldiers of his opponents who had come into his camp during the period of fraternisation should be sought for and sent back. But, of the number of military tribunes and centurions, several remained with him of their own free will. He afterwards held these (men) in high esteem; he restored the centurions to their former rank, (and conferred) tribunician status on the Roman knights. 

Chapter 78.  Afranius' men were finding it hard to forage, (and) were obtaining water with difficulty. Their legionaries had a sufficient supply of corn, because they had been ordered to bring twenty-two days' worth of corn from Ilerda; (but) the targeteers and the auxiliaries (had) none, for their opportunities to procure (any) were scarce, and their bodies (were) not accustomed to bearing any burdens. And so a great number of them came over to Caesar every day. Their situation was facing such difficulties. But, of the two proposed plans, it seemed more expedient to return to Ilerda, because they had left a little corn there. (And once) there, they trusted that they could consider another plan. Tarraco was further away; (and) in this distance they realised that their circumstances could encounter a greater number of misfortunes. This decision having met with approval, they set out from their camp. His cavalry having been sent ahead to harass and retard the rear of their column, Caesar himself followed closely with his legions. Not a moment passed, but their rearguard was engaged in battle with our cavalry. 

Chapter 79.  The nature of the fighting was as follows. Cohorts without baggage brought up the rear of their column, and several (of them) made a stand on the level ground. If there was a mountain to be climbed, the very nature of the place readily warded off any danger, because from their higher position those who had gone ahead protected from above those who were ascending; when a valley or a place with an incline was before (them), and those who had gone ahead could not provide any assistance to the tardy, then their (enemy's) cavalry threw their missiles at their backs from the higher ground, (and) then their situation was (one of) great danger. The only thing left (to them) was that, when they were approaching a place of this kind, they should order the legionary standards to come to a halt, and drive back our cavalry with a great charge, and that, when it had withdrawn, they should suddenly all rush out at full speed and descend into the valleys, and so cross (them) again and halt on the higher ground. For they were so far away (from deriving) any assistance from their own cavalry, of which they had a considerable number, that they were obliged to receive them, daunted (as they were) from their previous battles, into the midst of their column, and voluntarily to protect them; nor could anyone quit their (line of) march without being intercepted by Caesar's cavalry.    

Chapter 80.  While the fighting took place in this manner, they advanced slowly and gradually, and they halted frequently to be of assistance to their own (men), as then happened on this occasion. For, after advancing for four miles, while being vigorously harassed by our cavalry, they occupied a high hill, and there they constructed a camp with a single front facing the enemy, and they did not remove the baggage from their pack animals. When they noticed that Caesar's camp (had been) pitched and his tents erected, and that his cavalrymen (had been) sent out to forage, they suddenly rushed out at about the sixth hour (i.e. noon) on the same day, and, with the hope of our being delayed by the departure of our cavalry, they began to march. Having perceived this action (of theirs), Caesar followed them closely with the legions that had been resting, (but) left a few cohorts to guard the baggage; he ordered the foraging (parties) and the horsemen to be recalled and to follow at the tenth hour (i.e. 4 p.m). The cavalry swiftly resumed their daily duties on the march. They charged so fiercely at the rear of their column that they almost fled, and several of their soldiers, and a number of their centurions also, were killed. Caesar's force was hard on their heels and threatened their entire (army). 

10. The Pompeians capitulate (Chapters 81-87).

Chapter 81.  But, then, since no opportunity had been given (them) to look for a suitable place for a camp or to go forward, they were obliged to halt and pitch camp some distance away from any water and on ground (which was) unfavourable by nature. But, for reasons which have been explained above, Caesar did not provoke a battle. And from that day (on) he did not allow any tents to be erected, so that (his men) might all be the more ready to go in pursuit, whether they tried to break out at night or during the day. Observing the defects of their camp, the (enemy) (spent) the whole night extending their fortifications and exchanging (one) camp for (another) camp. From dawn on the following day they did the same (thing) and consumed the whole day on this task. But the more they proceeded with this work and enlarged their camp, the further away they were from water, and the remedy for the existing evil was provided by other evils. On the first night no one went out from the camp to fetch water; on the following day, leaving a guard in the camp. they led out all of their troops to (look for) water, (but) no one was sent out to forage. Caesar preferred that they should be weakened by hardships and submit to the inevitable surrender rather than to determine the issue by battle. Yet, he sought to hem them in with a rampart and a trench, so that he might check any of their sudden sallies as effectively as possible; (for) he thought that they would be forced to come down to this. The(enemy) ordered all their baggage cattle to be slaughtered, induced both by the lack of fodder and so that they might be the more ready to march. 

Chapter 82.  Two days were spent on these tasks and their planning. By the third day a considerable part of Caesar's work had already been completed. In order to obstruct the remaining fortification works, the (enemy leaders) led out their legions at a given signal at around the ninth hour (i.e. 3 p.m.) and formed (them) up in line of battle just outside the camp. Caesar recalled his legionaries from their work, (then) ordered his cavalry to assemble, and formed a battle-line; for to be seen to have shirked a battle contrary to the expectation and opinion of all his soldiers would have brought considerable loss (to his reputation). But for the same reasons, which are known, he was persuaded from wishing to engage, and all the more too, because, even if his adversaries were put to flight, the shortness of the space would not much help to achieve a decisive victory. For the (one) camp was not more than two miles away from the (other) camp. The two battle-lines occupied two thirds of this space; the remaining third was left for the soldiers' charges and attacks. If battle were joined, the proximity of the camp would give the defeated a speedy (source of) refuge in flight. For this reason he (i.e. Caesar) resolved to resist any attacks and not (to be) the first to go into battle.   

Chapter 83.  Afranius' (first) two battle-lines consisted of five legions; auxiliary cohorts formed a third line in reserve; Caesar's (army was drawn up) in three (lines); but four cohorts from (each of) his five legions formed the first line, and three each, and then again three others from each one of his legions, followed (as) reserves; the archers and slingers were kept together in the centre of the battle-line, (and) the cavalry covered the flanks. The battle-lines having been drawn up in such a (manner), each side seemed to adhere to its plan: Caesar not to join battle unless compelled (to do so), his (enemy) to obstruct Caesar's works. The stalemate, however, was prolonged, until sunset; then, both sides dispersed to their camp. The next day, Caesar arranged to finish the fortifications (he had) begun; the (enemy) tried to ford the River Sicoris, if it were possible to cross (it). As soon as he noticed this activity, Caesar sent some light-armed German (troops) and a party of horsemen across the river and stationed plenty of sentries on its banks.    

Chapter 84.  At length, having been kept short of everything, now (being) without fodder for the pack animals they had kept for four days, (and) with a shortage of water, firewood and corn, they sought a conference, and this, if it could be arranged, at some distance from the soldiers. When the latter (request) was rejected by Caesar, but a public conference was granted, if they were willing, Afranius' son was offered in the position of a hostage to Caesar. In the hearing of both armies, Afranius (then) spoke: (he said) that there should be no ill-will against themselves (i.e. himself and Petreius) or their soldiers, because they had wished to keep faith with regard to their commander Gnaeus Pompey. But now they had discharged their duty sufficiently, and had borne enough suffering by enduring the want of every necessity. But now, penned in almost like wild beasts, they were being prevented from (procuring) water, they were being prevented from moving on, and they could not endure either the bodily pain or the mental disgrace. And so they they acknowledged themselves vanquished; and they begged and entreated that, if there was any room left for mercy, they should not be forced to receive the ultimate punishment. He put forward this (plea) in as humble and submissive a (manner) as possible. 

Chapter 85.  To these (words) Caesar replied (as follows): that, of all (of us), no one has less right to such expressions of complaint and self-pity (than you). For everyone else had excelled in their duties; he, himself, in that he had been reluctant to engage in battle even on advantageous terms and at a favourable place and time, so that all (things pertaining) to peace should be unimpaired; his army, in that they had preserved and protected (those) whom they had in their power, despite the injuries (which they had) received and the slaying of their (comrades); and even the soldiers of their army, in that they had, on their own initiative, put in motion (talks) about concluding peace, by which action they thought to secure the lives of all their (comrades). So the parts played by all sections had agreed on compassion, (but) their leaders shrank from peace; they had no regard for the conventions of a conference or a truce, and those innocent men, who had been deceived by (the holding of) a conference, they put to death most cruelly. So it happened to them, as is generally wont to happen to men of excessive obstinacy and arrogance, that they have had recourse to the very (thing), and (indeed) to beg for it most earnestly, which they had spurned shortly beforehand. Nor, due to their humiliation or any present advantages (of his), would he demand any terms by which his resources might be increased; but (only) that they would disband those armies which they had now been maintaining against him for (so) many years. For, for no other reason (than this) had six legions been sent to Spain, and a seventh raised there, and many powerful fleets provided and generals experienced in military affairs sent (there). That none of these (measures had been) adopted to keep Spain at peace, nor for the benefit of the province, which, because of the length of the peace, did not require any such assistance. That all these (things) had been designed against him sometime ago, so that the same (person) (i.e. Pompey) should preside over the affairs of the City from its gates and have possession of two most warlike provinces for so many years in his absence; that the rights of magistrates had been altered to his disadvantage, so that they should not be sent to the provinces from the praetorship and the consulate, as (had) always (happened before), but they should be appointed and chosen by a faction. that, to his disadvantage, the plea of age (now) counted for nothing, but that (those who had) proved themselves in earlier wars should be recalled to the command of armies; that, with regard to him alone, (the rule was) not observed that had always been granted to every general, that, after a war had been successfully waged, they should return home and disband their army either with some (mark of) honour or, at least, without disgrace. That he had, however, borne all of these (things) with patience, and that he would submit (to them still); nor did he now intend  to take their army away from them and keep (it) himself, (something) which would not, however, be difficult for him (to do), but (only) so that they should not have it to be able to employ against him. Therefore, as he had said (before), let them quit the provinces and disband their army; if this were done, he would harm no one. This was his one and final condition for peace.

Chapter 86.  But it was very pleasing and delightful to the soldiers, as could be seen from their own signs (of joy), that those who had been expecting some just penalty, should obtain the reward of a discharge unsolicited. For, when a debate occurred about the place and the timing of their dismissal, they all began to indicate, both by word and gestures from the rampart where they stood, (that is) that they should be discharged immediately, nor, even if every pledge were given, could they be sure (it would happen), if it were deferred to another date. When there had been a discussion in a few words on both sides, the decision came down to this, that those who had a dwelling or a property in Spain should be discharged at once, (and) the rest at the River Var (i.e. the south-east boundary of Gallia Transalpina); a guarantee was given by Caesar that no harm should be inflicted upon them, nor should anyone be compelled to take the military oath against his will. 

Chapter 87.  Caesar promised that he would provide (them) with corn from that time until they came to the River Var. He added also that whatever any of them had lost during the war, (and) which was (now) in the hands of his own men, would be restored to those who had lost (them); he paid money to his soldiers for those things, after a fair evaluation had been made. Whatever disputes the soldiers afterwards had among themselves, they voluntarily submitted to Caesar for judgment. When their pay was demanded by the legions, and a mutiny almost occurred, Petreius and Afranius asserted that the time for this had not yet come; Caesar was asked to investigate, and both sides were satisfied with what he decided in this (case). About a third part of their army having been dismissed in two days, he ordered two of his own legions to go ahead, and the others to follow close behind, so that they could build camps at a distance not far from each other, and he put his legate Quintus Fufius Calenus in charge of this business. At his order, they marched from Spain to the River Var, and there the remaining part of their army was disbanded.